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Volume 20 - Issue 16, August 02 - 15, 2003
India's National Magazine
from the publishers of THE HINDU
Home • Contents
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THE STATES
A route of hope
NAUNIDHI KAUR
in Gangtok and Nathu La
The agreement with China to reopen border trade through Nathu La has raised hopes of an economic boom in Sikkim, but is the State ready to seize the opportunity?
NAUNIDHI KAUR
The barbed wire fence that marks the India-China border at Nathu La.
THE barbed wire fence at Nathu La that indicates India's border with China stands at the end of a narrow road. Controlled by the Army, the road does not allow at a time anything larger than a jeep. Army personnel restrict the inflow of tourist taxis, of which not more than 200 get permits to go up to Nathu La. For four decades after the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Nathu La has remained a no-no pass. It was thrown open to tourists a couple of years ago, but did not have much to offer them. There are no ceremonial rituals such as the one seen at the Wagah border post between India and Pakistan.
Now things have changed. Since Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced the opening of the historic Silk Route trade links through Nathu La, things have not been the same in Sikkim. In the official residence of Chief Minister Pawan Kumar Chamling, in the Legislative Assembly and even in restaurants in Gangtok, there is much expectation over how the State, which has been dependent on federal dole, will benefit from the decision.
Insiders claim that the State government never really expected its long-standing demand of opening of the Silk Route through Nathu La to materialise. However, reacting to the declaration, Chamling said: "Things are in place. Within two months we shall present a feasibility report to the Central government on what infrastructural development needs to be taken up in Sikkim for it to utilise effectively the benefits of the opening of the trade route through Nathu La." A high-level committee has been formed to prepare this report. At the top of the agenda is the development of a new township between 15 Mile and Tsomgo in order to create warehousing facilities. Another township will be developed between Ranka and Ranipool. Tsomgo, which is 17 km from Nathu La, at present is mostly constituted by small, makeshift shops, which cater to tourists. The State government plans to develop Tsomgo into a trading township. The first stop for traders who travel along the Silk Route will be Tsomgo. The joint declaration signed between India and China in June says that the Indian side agrees to "designate Tsomgo of Sikkim State" as the venue for the border market and that China will designate Renqinggang of the Tibet Autonomous Region as the border market on its side.
Chamling sees opportunities for Sikkim in the opening of the trade route. "It will generate employment in tourism- and transport-related businesses. Investors from industry and development organisations such as the World Bank will no doubt be attracted towards Sikkim. In order to maximise the benefits, the people of Sikkim will have to upgrade their capacity-building skills," he said.
The Sikkim government hopes to launch a bus service from Gangtok to Lhasa. It is also looking forward to infrastructural support from the Central government to upgrade the road to Nathu La into a motorable one. It has sinking zones and parts of it fall in landslide-prone areas. The fact that one climbs 9,000 feet (2,700 metres) within a distance of about 10 km gives an idea of the gradient of the road. However, the widening of roads might prove to be one of the easiest tasks before the government.
NAUNIDHI KAUR
Tsomgo, which is to be developed into a trading town, is now constituted mostly by makeshift shops that cater to tourists.
Optimistic Sikkimese business fora predict that regional exports to Sikkim would touch $203 million, with the cross-border sale of vegetables, oils and household items. Economic development of the region will now get an impetus, with a flourishing border trade. The Indian Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has predicted unprecedented economic development of the region, which includes the Greater Mekong region of Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Bangladesh, Bhutan and the Yunnan province of China. It predicts that Nathu La will provide the key connectivity to develop the trade bloc.
However, the ICC has based its predictions on some conditions. The northeastern States would have to tap the Chinese markets for their products and look at the Nathu La route as a more effective land route. These States would have to pull themselves up and effectively take on the challenge posed by the import of cheap Chinese goods. Secondly, India has to become a new source point for intermediary products, which could feed Chinese factories that produce manufactured goods. Thirdly, the northeastern region would have to push itself and become an agro export zone. Fourthly, partnerships and joint ventures would help in accessing markets of third countries such as Taiwan, Indochina, Japan and Korea by utilising the Chinese export marketing network. Lastly, tourism could thrive in the region with land routes readily available.
For all this to happen Sikkim will have to find the political will to change things. It would not only have to study how the region can develop in an integrated manner but also have to judge how serious the Central government is in bringing about some of the promised changes. A degree of sobriety is lent by the situation on the ground. More than 25 years after Sikkim's merger with the Indian Union, industry is still at a nascent stage in the State. In 1992, the existing industrial units provided employment to over 4,000 persons, hardly 1 per cent of the State's population. The reasons attributed to this poor performance are industrial sickness and governance-related distortions in the private sector. Entrepreneurs from outside the State find it difficult to furnish documents such as domicile residential certificates. Land laws in Sikkim do not allow the alienation of land. Poor social and industrial infrastructure, coupled with a lack of natural resources, has generated a cloud of gloom among the trading and entrepreneurial community. As of now, the State government is optimistic about exporting items such as organic cardamom and ginger, mango, local chilli and construction items to Tibet.
Much hope is pinned on tourism, which is expected to generate employment. Lukendra Rasaily, the secretary, Travel Agents' Association of Sikkim, said: "Working out the modalities of the trade would take a long time. Sikkim would benefit tremendously if the government opens a Buddhist circuit at the border, a combined tour of monasteries in Tibet and in India. The passage through Nathu La can be used for the Manasarovar Yatra." The mountain treks, picturesque lakes such as Tsomgo, and the rhododendrons of north Sikkim attract more than 12,000 foreign tourists and two lakh domestic tourists annually to the State. The tourism industry has led to the creation of jobs and boosted the economy over the past few years. "Most foreign tourists who want to go to Tibet go through Kathmandu. If we open the passage through Nathu La for tourism, at least 25 per cent of those tourists will pass through India. This will boost the local economy," Rasaily said.
The government will have to be proactive in monitoring and checking the movement of people across the border. The State government plans to set up a counter-intelligence service in the State Police Department.
A section of the Indian Army remains strongly opposed to the opening of the border, on strategic grounds. This section of the Army has expressed its concern over the construction of road, rail and air heads in the Tibet Autonomous Region. It fears that the ongoing 1,118-km railway project to link Gormo in China's Qinghai province with Lhasa in Tibet will enhance the induction and sustenance capability of Chinese troops in Tibet. This railway line, which costs a whopping $27.2 billion, will connect Lhasa with four major Chinese centres. This highly reliable and versatile network of defence feeder railway lines from mainland China up to the international border with India has put India's defence establishment on high alert. Two former Prime Ministers, P.V. Narasimha Rao and H.D. Deve Gowda, had rejected proposals to open the trade route.
NAUNIDHI KAUR
The lake at Tsomgo, a tourist attraction.
The issue gets complicated further given the presence of Tibetans in Sikkim. If the opening of the trade route is being seen as de jure acceptance by China that Sikkim is a part of India, then Tibet has also been accepted by India as being a part of China. Tibetan organisations and the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamshala in Himachal Pradesh have protested against the move. In Sikkim, the reaction from the 6,000-strong Tibetan community has been much more subdued. There have been no demonstrations or written petitions.
The majority of Tibetans in Sikkim are second-generation migrants. Although they live in Sikkim as refugees, they are fairly integrated into Sikkimese society as a result of inter-marriages and trade links in the local Sikkimese community. T.Y.C. Jimba Phuntosk, president of the Tibetan Youth Club, a civic group which has been demanding the complete independence of Tibet, said: "We are aware of the laws and will not go against them. At the same time we would like to sound a word of caution against China."
To what extent does the acceptance of trade through Nathu La mean that China has accepted Sikkim to be a part of India? Has the opening of the trade route resulted in China's de jure acceptance of Sikkim's 1975 accession to India? Said Chamling: "China can say what it wants to. As the Chief Minister of Sikkim and as its representative, I have always maintained that Sikkim is an integral part of India. We are the only State to join India through a referendum." Chamling lays stress on Sikkim's "reverse integration" with India. It is also not uncommon to come across graffiti like "Kanchenjunga to Kanyakumari: One India" in Sikkim. All these are subtle though effective indicators of Sikkim's integration with India.
At the diplomatic level, however, the dominant opinion is that the meeting between the Indian Prime Minister and his Chinese counterpart has not resolved the issue of Sikkim's integration with India. Differences over semantics have ensured that nothing concrete has come out on paper. Although the talks have not resulted in any solution, there is a reduction in the level of the dispute between China and India on the recognition of Sikkim as being a part of India. The Sikkim government has urged the Central government to include representatives from Sikkim in the committee that has been set up by India and China to resolve the border disputes.
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Tuesday, October 19, 2010
Sunday, January 3, 2010
CHINA BECOMING A SUPERPOWER
AND INDIA'S OPTIONS
by Sreedhar
A general impression going around amongst the Indian strategic community is that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is becoming superpower in the next 20 years. It may even offer a challenge to the US by that time. It is further argued that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is going to be a formidable force in the years to come because of the ongoing modernisation plans. Some even argue that now is the correct time to resolve the Sino-Indian border question and establish cordial relations as quickly as possible with China. Whatever may be reasons for this Indian mindset, whether it was the 1962 debacle or the 1964 Chinese nuclear explosion, these arguments need a closer examination.
The Wars the PLA Fought
Korean War of 1950-51
Before we examine Sino-Indian relations, the first question that needs to be asked is whether the PLA is really militarily so superior as compared to the Indian armed forces or not? A close scrutiny of the PLA’s performance during the past 47 years indicates that at every given opportunity, the PLA flexed its muscle and its performance can best be described as a mixed kitty. During the late Chairman Mao’s years, the PLA went into action five times - three times to fight a war with neighbours, once to fight the US “imperialism” and once to occupy the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. The first was in 1950-Y when the PL4 clashed with the US forces in the Korean Peninsula. Whatever may be the claims made by the Chinese, the PLA was defeated and suffered heavy casualties. Many would argue that the technological superiority of the US armed forces played a decisive role in the defeat of the PLA.
Sino-Idian War of 1962
A decade later, after the failure of Chairman Mao’s Great Leap Forward Programme, in October 1962, China decided to resolve the Sino-Indian border issue by the use of force. In October 1962, the PLA moved in swiftly, defeated the Indian Army and declared unilateral ceasefire after taking possession of approximately 30,000 sq km of Indian territory. Though no official history of the war from the Indian side has been published as yet, the Chinese official version is that they repulsed the Indian attack on Chinese territory. Various versions of the people associated with that war from the Indian side, however, indicate that the Chinese succeeded largely due to the failure of the politico-military leadership of India to assess correctly the PLA’s capabilities. Way back in 1974 itself, people like K. Subrahmanyam, who were associated with China during that crucial period in India’s Ministry of Defence, argued that had the Indian Air Force been pressed into action, the course of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 would have been different. In fact, at the time of the war itself elder statesman of India, C. Rajagopalachari, advocated the deployment of the Air Force by India to destroy the supply lines of the Chinese Army.
Nathu La of 1967
Three years later, in 1965, two significant events took place on the Sine-Indian border. The first was the warning issued to India about Chinese sheep not being allowed to graze on their side of the border by India. This happened in September 1965 when the Indo-Pak war was simmering on India’s western border.
At the same time, in September-December 1965, the PLA sent probing missions on the entire Sikkim-Tibet border. According to one account, there were seven border intrusions on the Sikkim-Tibet border between September 7 and December 12, 1965, involving the PLA. In all these border incursions, the Indian side responded “firmly” without provoking the other. Though details of casualties of these PLA border incursions are not reported, there were reports indicating that the PLA suffered “heavy” casualties against “moderate” loss by India.
Two years later, in September 1967, in spite of their setbacks in 1965, the PLA launched a direct attack on the lndian armed forces at Nathu La, on the Sikkim-Tibet border. The six-day “border skirmishes” from September 7-6 to 13, 1967, had all the elements of a high drama, including exchange of heavy artillery fire, and the PLA soldiers tried to cross the border in large numbers.
The attack was repulsed at all points, According to an account of this incident, from the details of the fighting available, it appeared the Chinese had received a severe mauling in the artillery duels across the barbed wire fence. Indian gunners scored several direct hits on Chinese bunkers, including a command post from where the Chinese operations were being directed. The Chinese were also known to have suffered at least twice as many casualties as the Indians in this encounter between Indian and Chinese armed forces.
The important point to be remembered in this context is that the late Chairman Mao launched his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) in 1965 and it reached its peak in 1967 to weed out all ‘anti-socialist elements” from the Chinese polity. Though many Sinologists would not like to describe the GPCR in any other manner, for an outsider like me, it was essentially a power struggle between Chairman Mao and his adversaries.
However, for the purposes of this essay, three significant things emerged from the Nathu La episode on the Sikkim-Tibet border. First, the Indian armed forces demonstrated beyond doubt that the PLA is not as strong and motivated as it was made out to be. In fact, there were rumours, around September 10, 1967, that the PLA was planning to bring in the Air Force to escalate the conflict. Sensing that the Indians were getting ready for such an eventuality, the Chinese official news agency, Xinhua, denied having any such plans.
Second, the Indian politico-military leadership quickly realised this myth about the PLA. This was clearly reflected in the unconditional ceasefire proposed by India in a note delivered to the Chinese on September 12, 1967, all along the Sikkim-Tibet border from 05.30 hrs on September 13. Though officially, the Chinese rejected this unilateral ceasefire offer by India, except for an occasional salvo by the PLA on September 13, 1967, there was a lull all along the border. Many observers felt India scored a psychological victory over the Chinese for the latter’s unilateral ceasefire in 1962.
Lastly, the Indian political leadership also realised that the PLA’s behavioural pattern on the border had something to do with the domestic turmoil then going on in China.
Ussuri Clashes of 1969
By March 1969, the GPCR entered its final phase and at that time the PLA decided that it could decide the border with the former Soviet Union by the use of force. On March 2-3, 1969, there were “border skirmishes” in the area of the Nizhnemikhallovka border post on the Ussuri River. The intruding PLA men were confronted by the Soviet Red Army and their attack was repulsed.
Again, on March 15, 1969, the PLA launched a fresh attack with an infantry regiment strength (estimated to be 2,000 men) with support units at Damansky Island on the Ussuri River. According to the details of the war available, initially the Chinese succeeded in penetrating the island under cover of artillery and mortar fire from their side of the river. But a massive retaliation by the Red Army made the PLA beat a hasty retreat.
Like they had to bring in the Air Force to meet the Indian armed forces’ challenge, this time too, the PLA is reported to have “activated” their North China Sea fleet, but nothing happened; it turned out to be an empty threat.
Again there were border skirmishes in August 1969 in the Xinjiang sector of the Sino-Soviet border between the PLA and the Red Army.
It is a part of history now that the PLA could not take on the Red Army and the Chinese were forced to come to the conference table to resolve the issue through peaceful negotiations.
Capturing of paracle Island in 1974
After the end of the GPCR in 1969.70, it is still a debatable question, whether Chairman Mao eliminated all his adversaries or not, but radical changes came into the structure and hierarchy of the PLA. Apparently the aging Chairman Mao, in a swift move, ordered the PLA to go and capture the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. With the ongoing conflict in Indo-China al that time, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Vietnam. who also claimed part of these islands, did not offer any resistance to the PLA’s occupation of the islands.
Virtually without firing a shot, the PLA had a total success in this operation.
An assessment of these five PLA actions indicates that it had a total success in two operations and suffered defeat on three other occasions. The PLA success story is also due to the timing of the campaign like in the Paracel Islands. Whenever the PLA confronted an adversary without any element of surprise, or an adversary who challenged them, its performance was poor. This was obvious from the Korean war, and the Nathu La and Ussrui incidents. In fact, in the Nathu La and Ussuri incidents, the PLA did not offer even stiff resistance. From all accounts, it made a hasty retreat the instant the adversary offered stiff resistance or acted “decisively”.
All these five actions of the PLA also clearly indicate three things: (a) the late Chairman Mao, wanted to consolidate his country’s boundaries as quickly as possible, and in that exercise, advantage China should be the guiding principle; (b) also, he pressed the PLA into action, whenever his plans to accelerate the peace of economic developments failed; and (c) in all these wars/engagements, the PL4 was not as professional as it was made out to be.
Sino-Vietnam War of 1979
In the post-Mao period, after the initial years’ power struggle was over and Deng Xiaoping managed to place himself firmly in the saddle, he too looked to the PLA to resolve the outstanding claims of China on its borders. The first was, of course, the now famous February 1979 war with Vietnam. Deng wanted “to teach a lesson” to the Vietnamese. In that Sine-Vietnam war, the PLA was badly mauled and forced to retreat. The battlehardened Vietnamese with better strategy and motivation were able to take on the PLA and inflict heavy casualties. According to one strategic commentator, The only thing the Chinese are not interested to discuss is the Sino-Vietnam war of 1979.”
Deng realised that there was need to improve the technological superiority of the PLA. Consequently, the military modernisation segment of the Four Modernisations Programme (the other three being agriculture, industry, and science and technology) was acelerated. Accordingly, we notice greater allocations for defence in the Chinese budget since then.
Sumdorong Cho Valley incident of 1985
Six and half years later, Deng decided to flex China’s muscles again with India. In mid-1986, it came to the notice of India that the PLA had built a helipad at Wandung in Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. India reacted swiftly and the PLA had an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the India Army in Sumdorong Chu Valley of Arunchal Pradesh in August 1986. After a week of tense moments both sides mutually agreed to withdraw their forces inside their respective territories and create a no man’s land. The Chinese posture at that time clearly indicated that Beijing quickly realised that 1962 cannot be repeated. Afterwards, we saw some writings in the PLA’s official organ, Liberation Army Daily, about the professionalism the Indian armed forces.
Sine-Vietnam Clashes in the South China Sea
Called the Truong Sa Archipelago by Vietnam, and the Nansha Islands by China, the Spratlys consist of about 150 reefs, sandbanks and islands in the South China Sea, 350 km from Vietnam’s coast and 1,000 km tram China. They straddle busy shipping lanes and are, therefore, strategically important. In addition, the preliminary geological surveys have shown that this area has vast deposits of crude oil and natural gas.
Both China and Vietnam claimed the Spratlys for centuries, but up to 1987 had been content with a war of words. However, from early 1967 onwards, the Chinese started putting markers on some of these islands, making it clear that they had asserted their sovereignty over them. Simultaneously, the PLA also started strengthening its presence and started conducting naval exercises in and around the Spratlys.
This brought a sharp reaction from Vietnam and in the subsequent protest notes exchanged, both sides accused each other of provocation, and claimed that the other side would bear the responsibility and consequences of its actions.
On March 14,1988, the PLA’s Navy clashed with the Vietnamese Navy for the first time. Though it was a very short confrontation, both sides suffered considerable casualties. But the tension continued up to the end of the month. In late March 1988, the war-weary Vietnam proposed bilateral talks with China to resolve the issue. As usual, the Chinese rejected the offer initially, but later agreed to the Vietnamese proposal.
However, fresh tensions erupted in May 1992, when the Chinese authorities leased an oil concession to an American Firm, Creston Energy, for oil exploration in and around the Spratlys, and Vietnam took strong objection to it.
From 1993 onwards, both China and Vietnam realised that they could not resolve the issue militarily and started negotiations.
Invincible PLA ?
Like Mao, Deng also tried to use the PLA to settle the border issues by use of force but had no success. With the Deng era coming to an end, what his successors would do can only be a matter of speculation. They may or may not continue this policy of using force to settle the “Middle Kingdwn’s” boundades.
But the lessons others can draw from the PLA’s past engagements is that the PLA’s conventional armed forces are not an invincible force as they are being made out to be by a section of the Indian strategic community. As far as China’s nuclear capabilities are concerned, the Chinese have given a solemn undertaking to the international community that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. And the doyen of India’s nuclear programme, Dr. Raja Ramanna, in October 1996, observed that the country has acquired the nuclear weapon manufacturing capability. In other words, we have the needed nuclear deterrent capability.
The other aspect of the PLA is its equipment. Right from the liberation of mainland China in October 1949, the Chinese strongly believed in self-reliance. At the height of the Sine-Soviet friendship, in the early 1950s, a considerable amount of Soviet technology was transferred to China. One can say that the Chinese arms industry was built on this in the subsequent years. The Soviet technology stopped coming from the mid-1950s onwards. With the embargo and containment policy of the West up to 1971, the Chinese arms industry, it is generally agreed upon by China watchers, remained, more or less, stagnant.
In other words, for about 16-17 years, China had no access to any rapidly changing conventional arms technology in the international arms market. In addition, how much the social engineering experiments of the late Chairman Mao affected the overall technological standards in the PLA and outside is a debatable question. Some Western scholars have observed that the PLA was insulated against the social upheavals created by the late Chairman Mao. Still, at least two generations of young people were affected by Chairman Mao’s experiments in the 1950s and 1960s. This must have automatically resulted in a low level of technological base in the Chinese society. It certainly affected the civil sector, We can see this by the low quality of Chinese consumer products. And, therefore, its impact on the arms industry cannot be ruled out.
Whatever may be the actual position, there has been a scramble for weapon related technology since 1971, from the international market by China - how much they are able to absorb is an open ended question and can be debated.
The performance of the equipment the Chinese are selling in the international market leaves much to be desired. For instance, some of the biggest recipients of Chinese arms like Pakistan, North Korea and Iran have bought this equipment as a last choice, when it was denied to them from others or they were cash starved. In fact, the Pakistani arms acquisition pattern over the years indicates that their first preference is arms from the West and the last choice is China. This is in spite of an indepth relationship with China, and the fact that Chinese equipment is cheap and available on easy credit.
In this part of the world, the Chinese equipment saw action in war in recent years only in the Iraq-Iran war of the 1990s. The Iranians used the Silkworm missiles from China quite successfully to confront Iraq, but in the later stages of the war only, when Iraqi ammunition was almost depleted.
Therefore, one need not be unduly alarmed at the technological level of the PLA’s weapon systems.
Myth of Economic Miracle
The other myth that is perpetuated by a group of China watchers is that Beijing is likely to become an economic superpower in the next two decades, that is, by about 2015 or so. And to support their argument, the World Bank report on China and the Economist (London) are liberally quoted. One is tempted to compare this Chinese miracle with the 1970s’ assessments of the West about China’s crude oil reserves, There used to be screaming headlines in the mid-1970s in the Western Press saying that China’s crude oil reserves are bigger than Saudi Arabia’s, We, at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, were the first to question these assessments, and the late Mr. Mirchandani, then General Manager of the United News of India promptly carried it on his wire services, Within a few months, that bubble burst.
The Chinese economy witnessed some spectacular development (but not development in the broad sense of the term, that is economic, cultural, social, etc, which India is attempting) of 10-t 1 per cent growth in recent years. This has been achieved largely due to heavy doses of foreign investment. Here one should not forget the fact that the foreign investor will continue to make investments only if his profits are assured. One more factor needs to be borne in mind here, international capital has no nationality and concepts like nationalism and patriotism have no relevance to it. The overseas Chinese who made the bulk of investments in China may not continue to do so. Already reports are appearing in the international media that investors in China are not happy with their returns and are looking for greener pastures. This means that the flow of foreign investments into China is going to slow down in the years to come. And in the long run, the Chinese economy may have to settle down for a 5-6 per cent growth rate. Anything beyond that requires at least a couple of trillion dollars of investments in the next two to three decades, First, that type of capital is not available in the international capital market. The $80 billion foreign investment of the past decade created such regional and social imbalances in China that the Chinese authorities have been forced to take a fresh look at the process of liberalisation of the economy.
Therefore, in these circumstances, China becoming an economic superpower, say in the next 20 years, can at best be described as wishful thinking by members of a China admirers’ club. And, in fact, a couple of Chinese scholars with whom I interacted with in 1993 were surprised at these assessments. They said that like in any planned economy, they too fixed some target; and if they can achieve even 50 per cent of those targets, they would consider their planning process successful. This is understandable. In fact, any student of economics will be able to tell that a developing country with a population of one billion plus cannot sustain a 10-l 1 per cent growth rate for too long.
Indian Policy Options
It is in this backdrop that we must examine India’s policy options vis-a-vis China in the short and medium terms. To discuss long term perspectives at this stage is not feasible as there are so many imponderables.
At one level, the current phase of Sir-m-Indian relations started some time in the early 1980s by the late Indian Prime Minsister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, progressed satisfactorily, except for the 1985 aberration mentioned earlier. In fact, from 1987 onwards, efforts were on from both sides to ensure that 1995 is not repeated. Both sides took a number of confidence building measures, including high level political visits, armed forces to armed forces contacts, dialogue at various levels, etc. The Sine Indian joint working group has been meeting regularly. Even the bilateral trade which was at a low level, started picking up. In other words, both India and China have engaged themselves in a constructive dialogue which proved to be mutually beneficial.
Can we take this relationship forward? This is the question haunting many policy analysts. In this context, one needs to look into three broad ‘areas. Foremost among them is the border question. This issue has two dimensions. First, some-boundary specialists would argue that at the end of 1994, there were more than 100 disputed boundaries around the world. This is a vexed problem of the international community and there are no fixed ground rules for this. And these experts feel that after the 1958-59 India-China boundary talks, it became clear that this issue has no academic solution.
Second, India is not in a position to cede any territory to others except for a few kilometers this way or that. Therefore, to resolve the vexed boundary issue and establish cordial relations with India, China has to vacate the occupied territory.
In addition, both Jiang Zemin and Atal Behari Vajpayee are new to the centre of power in their respective countries.
Neither of them are charismatic personalities like Pandit Jawaharfal Nehru, Mrs. Indira Gandhi , Chairman Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. They have limited political clout in their respective countries. Therefore, to expect the governments of these two leaders to find a solution to the decades-old India-China boundary question is just not possible. Hence, status quo will continue and this may remain as one of the unresolved boundary questions, which will be carried into the 21st century.
Second is the economic cooperation between the two countries. Both China and India are developing countries, and each side enjoys some advantage over the other in trade. Incidentally, both are exporters of primary commodities and semi-manufactured goods. At the moment, in the international market, India enjoys a marginal advantage over China, because of its being a member of the World Trade Organisation.
Otherwise, both the economies are competing with each other in the international market. Therefore, the scope for a larger volume of India-China trade is rather slim. The existing volume of India-China trade at around $1 billion may at best grow into $4.5 billion by the turn of the century In percentage terms of foreign trade of India and China, this is less than one per cent of each country’s trade. I am not arguing against increasing trade between China and India. But as I mentioned earlier, the ground realities are different. Any expectation of faster growth of India-China trade is nothing but wishful thinking.
India-China joint ventures in third countries is once again a low feasibility proposition because of the reasons mentioned above.
Therefore, we can assume that in the immediate future, say in the next ten years, both sides should reconcile to the fact that the existing level of economic cooperation cannot be improved dramatically, and efforts to improve upon it may result in some changes, but marginally only. In fact, here one should also note that China is mixing politics with economics to a certain extent. For example, China would prefer the US to India in awarding a contract.
Lastly, the option to improve people-to-people level contacts between India and China. This, undoubtedly, is one area where more interaction can take place between the two countries. But, the spirit of Hindi-Chini Bhai Thai of the 1950s cannot stage a comeback for obvious reasons.
To conclude, for their own strategic interests, both China and India broke the impasse that had set into their relations from 1962 onwards, in the early l980s, and continued to do so even in the 1990s. The political leadership of both these nations have, over the last 15 years, evolved a mature relationship which is mutually beneficial. To take it beyond this level in the immediate future does not seem possible at this point of time. However, both nations would continue the existing level of relationship in future also in their own interest.
AND INDIA'S OPTIONS
by Sreedhar
A general impression going around amongst the Indian strategic community is that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is becoming superpower in the next 20 years. It may even offer a challenge to the US by that time. It is further argued that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is going to be a formidable force in the years to come because of the ongoing modernisation plans. Some even argue that now is the correct time to resolve the Sino-Indian border question and establish cordial relations as quickly as possible with China. Whatever may be reasons for this Indian mindset, whether it was the 1962 debacle or the 1964 Chinese nuclear explosion, these arguments need a closer examination.
The Wars the PLA Fought
Korean War of 1950-51
Before we examine Sino-Indian relations, the first question that needs to be asked is whether the PLA is really militarily so superior as compared to the Indian armed forces or not? A close scrutiny of the PLA’s performance during the past 47 years indicates that at every given opportunity, the PLA flexed its muscle and its performance can best be described as a mixed kitty. During the late Chairman Mao’s years, the PLA went into action five times - three times to fight a war with neighbours, once to fight the US “imperialism” and once to occupy the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. The first was in 1950-Y when the PL4 clashed with the US forces in the Korean Peninsula. Whatever may be the claims made by the Chinese, the PLA was defeated and suffered heavy casualties. Many would argue that the technological superiority of the US armed forces played a decisive role in the defeat of the PLA.
Sino-Idian War of 1962
A decade later, after the failure of Chairman Mao’s Great Leap Forward Programme, in October 1962, China decided to resolve the Sino-Indian border issue by the use of force. In October 1962, the PLA moved in swiftly, defeated the Indian Army and declared unilateral ceasefire after taking possession of approximately 30,000 sq km of Indian territory. Though no official history of the war from the Indian side has been published as yet, the Chinese official version is that they repulsed the Indian attack on Chinese territory. Various versions of the people associated with that war from the Indian side, however, indicate that the Chinese succeeded largely due to the failure of the politico-military leadership of India to assess correctly the PLA’s capabilities. Way back in 1974 itself, people like K. Subrahmanyam, who were associated with China during that crucial period in India’s Ministry of Defence, argued that had the Indian Air Force been pressed into action, the course of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 would have been different. In fact, at the time of the war itself elder statesman of India, C. Rajagopalachari, advocated the deployment of the Air Force by India to destroy the supply lines of the Chinese Army.
Nathu La of 1967
Three years later, in 1965, two significant events took place on the Sine-Indian border. The first was the warning issued to India about Chinese sheep not being allowed to graze on their side of the border by India. This happened in September 1965 when the Indo-Pak war was simmering on India’s western border.
At the same time, in September-December 1965, the PLA sent probing missions on the entire Sikkim-Tibet border. According to one account, there were seven border intrusions on the Sikkim-Tibet border between September 7 and December 12, 1965, involving the PLA. In all these border incursions, the Indian side responded “firmly” without provoking the other. Though details of casualties of these PLA border incursions are not reported, there were reports indicating that the PLA suffered “heavy” casualties against “moderate” loss by India.
Two years later, in September 1967, in spite of their setbacks in 1965, the PLA launched a direct attack on the lndian armed forces at Nathu La, on the Sikkim-Tibet border. The six-day “border skirmishes” from September 7-6 to 13, 1967, had all the elements of a high drama, including exchange of heavy artillery fire, and the PLA soldiers tried to cross the border in large numbers.
The attack was repulsed at all points, According to an account of this incident, from the details of the fighting available, it appeared the Chinese had received a severe mauling in the artillery duels across the barbed wire fence. Indian gunners scored several direct hits on Chinese bunkers, including a command post from where the Chinese operations were being directed. The Chinese were also known to have suffered at least twice as many casualties as the Indians in this encounter between Indian and Chinese armed forces.
The important point to be remembered in this context is that the late Chairman Mao launched his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) in 1965 and it reached its peak in 1967 to weed out all ‘anti-socialist elements” from the Chinese polity. Though many Sinologists would not like to describe the GPCR in any other manner, for an outsider like me, it was essentially a power struggle between Chairman Mao and his adversaries.
However, for the purposes of this essay, three significant things emerged from the Nathu La episode on the Sikkim-Tibet border. First, the Indian armed forces demonstrated beyond doubt that the PLA is not as strong and motivated as it was made out to be. In fact, there were rumours, around September 10, 1967, that the PLA was planning to bring in the Air Force to escalate the conflict. Sensing that the Indians were getting ready for such an eventuality, the Chinese official news agency, Xinhua, denied having any such plans.
Second, the Indian politico-military leadership quickly realised this myth about the PLA. This was clearly reflected in the unconditional ceasefire proposed by India in a note delivered to the Chinese on September 12, 1967, all along the Sikkim-Tibet border from 05.30 hrs on September 13. Though officially, the Chinese rejected this unilateral ceasefire offer by India, except for an occasional salvo by the PLA on September 13, 1967, there was a lull all along the border. Many observers felt India scored a psychological victory over the Chinese for the latter’s unilateral ceasefire in 1962.
Lastly, the Indian political leadership also realised that the PLA’s behavioural pattern on the border had something to do with the domestic turmoil then going on in China.
Ussuri Clashes of 1969
By March 1969, the GPCR entered its final phase and at that time the PLA decided that it could decide the border with the former Soviet Union by the use of force. On March 2-3, 1969, there were “border skirmishes” in the area of the Nizhnemikhallovka border post on the Ussuri River. The intruding PLA men were confronted by the Soviet Red Army and their attack was repulsed.
Again, on March 15, 1969, the PLA launched a fresh attack with an infantry regiment strength (estimated to be 2,000 men) with support units at Damansky Island on the Ussuri River. According to the details of the war available, initially the Chinese succeeded in penetrating the island under cover of artillery and mortar fire from their side of the river. But a massive retaliation by the Red Army made the PLA beat a hasty retreat.
Like they had to bring in the Air Force to meet the Indian armed forces’ challenge, this time too, the PLA is reported to have “activated” their North China Sea fleet, but nothing happened; it turned out to be an empty threat.
Again there were border skirmishes in August 1969 in the Xinjiang sector of the Sino-Soviet border between the PLA and the Red Army.
It is a part of history now that the PLA could not take on the Red Army and the Chinese were forced to come to the conference table to resolve the issue through peaceful negotiations.
Capturing of paracle Island in 1974
After the end of the GPCR in 1969.70, it is still a debatable question, whether Chairman Mao eliminated all his adversaries or not, but radical changes came into the structure and hierarchy of the PLA. Apparently the aging Chairman Mao, in a swift move, ordered the PLA to go and capture the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. With the ongoing conflict in Indo-China al that time, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Vietnam. who also claimed part of these islands, did not offer any resistance to the PLA’s occupation of the islands.
Virtually without firing a shot, the PLA had a total success in this operation.
An assessment of these five PLA actions indicates that it had a total success in two operations and suffered defeat on three other occasions. The PLA success story is also due to the timing of the campaign like in the Paracel Islands. Whenever the PLA confronted an adversary without any element of surprise, or an adversary who challenged them, its performance was poor. This was obvious from the Korean war, and the Nathu La and Ussrui incidents. In fact, in the Nathu La and Ussuri incidents, the PLA did not offer even stiff resistance. From all accounts, it made a hasty retreat the instant the adversary offered stiff resistance or acted “decisively”.
All these five actions of the PLA also clearly indicate three things: (a) the late Chairman Mao, wanted to consolidate his country’s boundaries as quickly as possible, and in that exercise, advantage China should be the guiding principle; (b) also, he pressed the PLA into action, whenever his plans to accelerate the peace of economic developments failed; and (c) in all these wars/engagements, the PL4 was not as professional as it was made out to be.
Sino-Vietnam War of 1979
In the post-Mao period, after the initial years’ power struggle was over and Deng Xiaoping managed to place himself firmly in the saddle, he too looked to the PLA to resolve the outstanding claims of China on its borders. The first was, of course, the now famous February 1979 war with Vietnam. Deng wanted “to teach a lesson” to the Vietnamese. In that Sine-Vietnam war, the PLA was badly mauled and forced to retreat. The battlehardened Vietnamese with better strategy and motivation were able to take on the PLA and inflict heavy casualties. According to one strategic commentator, The only thing the Chinese are not interested to discuss is the Sino-Vietnam war of 1979.”
Deng realised that there was need to improve the technological superiority of the PLA. Consequently, the military modernisation segment of the Four Modernisations Programme (the other three being agriculture, industry, and science and technology) was acelerated. Accordingly, we notice greater allocations for defence in the Chinese budget since then.
Sumdorong Cho Valley incident of 1985
Six and half years later, Deng decided to flex China’s muscles again with India. In mid-1986, it came to the notice of India that the PLA had built a helipad at Wandung in Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. India reacted swiftly and the PLA had an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the India Army in Sumdorong Chu Valley of Arunchal Pradesh in August 1986. After a week of tense moments both sides mutually agreed to withdraw their forces inside their respective territories and create a no man’s land. The Chinese posture at that time clearly indicated that Beijing quickly realised that 1962 cannot be repeated. Afterwards, we saw some writings in the PLA’s official organ, Liberation Army Daily, about the professionalism the Indian armed forces.
Sine-Vietnam Clashes in the South China Sea
Called the Truong Sa Archipelago by Vietnam, and the Nansha Islands by China, the Spratlys consist of about 150 reefs, sandbanks and islands in the South China Sea, 350 km from Vietnam’s coast and 1,000 km tram China. They straddle busy shipping lanes and are, therefore, strategically important. In addition, the preliminary geological surveys have shown that this area has vast deposits of crude oil and natural gas.
Both China and Vietnam claimed the Spratlys for centuries, but up to 1987 had been content with a war of words. However, from early 1967 onwards, the Chinese started putting markers on some of these islands, making it clear that they had asserted their sovereignty over them. Simultaneously, the PLA also started strengthening its presence and started conducting naval exercises in and around the Spratlys.
This brought a sharp reaction from Vietnam and in the subsequent protest notes exchanged, both sides accused each other of provocation, and claimed that the other side would bear the responsibility and consequences of its actions.
On March 14,1988, the PLA’s Navy clashed with the Vietnamese Navy for the first time. Though it was a very short confrontation, both sides suffered considerable casualties. But the tension continued up to the end of the month. In late March 1988, the war-weary Vietnam proposed bilateral talks with China to resolve the issue. As usual, the Chinese rejected the offer initially, but later agreed to the Vietnamese proposal.
However, fresh tensions erupted in May 1992, when the Chinese authorities leased an oil concession to an American Firm, Creston Energy, for oil exploration in and around the Spratlys, and Vietnam took strong objection to it.
From 1993 onwards, both China and Vietnam realised that they could not resolve the issue militarily and started negotiations.
Invincible PLA ?
Like Mao, Deng also tried to use the PLA to settle the border issues by use of force but had no success. With the Deng era coming to an end, what his successors would do can only be a matter of speculation. They may or may not continue this policy of using force to settle the “Middle Kingdwn’s” boundades.
But the lessons others can draw from the PLA’s past engagements is that the PLA’s conventional armed forces are not an invincible force as they are being made out to be by a section of the Indian strategic community. As far as China’s nuclear capabilities are concerned, the Chinese have given a solemn undertaking to the international community that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. And the doyen of India’s nuclear programme, Dr. Raja Ramanna, in October 1996, observed that the country has acquired the nuclear weapon manufacturing capability. In other words, we have the needed nuclear deterrent capability.
The other aspect of the PLA is its equipment. Right from the liberation of mainland China in October 1949, the Chinese strongly believed in self-reliance. At the height of the Sine-Soviet friendship, in the early 1950s, a considerable amount of Soviet technology was transferred to China. One can say that the Chinese arms industry was built on this in the subsequent years. The Soviet technology stopped coming from the mid-1950s onwards. With the embargo and containment policy of the West up to 1971, the Chinese arms industry, it is generally agreed upon by China watchers, remained, more or less, stagnant.
In other words, for about 16-17 years, China had no access to any rapidly changing conventional arms technology in the international arms market. In addition, how much the social engineering experiments of the late Chairman Mao affected the overall technological standards in the PLA and outside is a debatable question. Some Western scholars have observed that the PLA was insulated against the social upheavals created by the late Chairman Mao. Still, at least two generations of young people were affected by Chairman Mao’s experiments in the 1950s and 1960s. This must have automatically resulted in a low level of technological base in the Chinese society. It certainly affected the civil sector, We can see this by the low quality of Chinese consumer products. And, therefore, its impact on the arms industry cannot be ruled out.
Whatever may be the actual position, there has been a scramble for weapon related technology since 1971, from the international market by China - how much they are able to absorb is an open ended question and can be debated.
The performance of the equipment the Chinese are selling in the international market leaves much to be desired. For instance, some of the biggest recipients of Chinese arms like Pakistan, North Korea and Iran have bought this equipment as a last choice, when it was denied to them from others or they were cash starved. In fact, the Pakistani arms acquisition pattern over the years indicates that their first preference is arms from the West and the last choice is China. This is in spite of an indepth relationship with China, and the fact that Chinese equipment is cheap and available on easy credit.
In this part of the world, the Chinese equipment saw action in war in recent years only in the Iraq-Iran war of the 1990s. The Iranians used the Silkworm missiles from China quite successfully to confront Iraq, but in the later stages of the war only, when Iraqi ammunition was almost depleted.
Therefore, one need not be unduly alarmed at the technological level of the PLA’s weapon systems.
Myth of Economic Miracle
The other myth that is perpetuated by a group of China watchers is that Beijing is likely to become an economic superpower in the next two decades, that is, by about 2015 or so. And to support their argument, the World Bank report on China and the Economist (London) are liberally quoted. One is tempted to compare this Chinese miracle with the 1970s’ assessments of the West about China’s crude oil reserves, There used to be screaming headlines in the mid-1970s in the Western Press saying that China’s crude oil reserves are bigger than Saudi Arabia’s, We, at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, were the first to question these assessments, and the late Mr. Mirchandani, then General Manager of the United News of India promptly carried it on his wire services, Within a few months, that bubble burst.
The Chinese economy witnessed some spectacular development (but not development in the broad sense of the term, that is economic, cultural, social, etc, which India is attempting) of 10-t 1 per cent growth in recent years. This has been achieved largely due to heavy doses of foreign investment. Here one should not forget the fact that the foreign investor will continue to make investments only if his profits are assured. One more factor needs to be borne in mind here, international capital has no nationality and concepts like nationalism and patriotism have no relevance to it. The overseas Chinese who made the bulk of investments in China may not continue to do so. Already reports are appearing in the international media that investors in China are not happy with their returns and are looking for greener pastures. This means that the flow of foreign investments into China is going to slow down in the years to come. And in the long run, the Chinese economy may have to settle down for a 5-6 per cent growth rate. Anything beyond that requires at least a couple of trillion dollars of investments in the next two to three decades, First, that type of capital is not available in the international capital market. The $80 billion foreign investment of the past decade created such regional and social imbalances in China that the Chinese authorities have been forced to take a fresh look at the process of liberalisation of the economy.
Therefore, in these circumstances, China becoming an economic superpower, say in the next 20 years, can at best be described as wishful thinking by members of a China admirers’ club. And, in fact, a couple of Chinese scholars with whom I interacted with in 1993 were surprised at these assessments. They said that like in any planned economy, they too fixed some target; and if they can achieve even 50 per cent of those targets, they would consider their planning process successful. This is understandable. In fact, any student of economics will be able to tell that a developing country with a population of one billion plus cannot sustain a 10-l 1 per cent growth rate for too long.
Indian Policy Options
It is in this backdrop that we must examine India’s policy options vis-a-vis China in the short and medium terms. To discuss long term perspectives at this stage is not feasible as there are so many imponderables.
At one level, the current phase of Sir-m-Indian relations started some time in the early 1980s by the late Indian Prime Minsister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, progressed satisfactorily, except for the 1985 aberration mentioned earlier. In fact, from 1987 onwards, efforts were on from both sides to ensure that 1995 is not repeated. Both sides took a number of confidence building measures, including high level political visits, armed forces to armed forces contacts, dialogue at various levels, etc. The Sine Indian joint working group has been meeting regularly. Even the bilateral trade which was at a low level, started picking up. In other words, both India and China have engaged themselves in a constructive dialogue which proved to be mutually beneficial.
Can we take this relationship forward? This is the question haunting many policy analysts. In this context, one needs to look into three broad ‘areas. Foremost among them is the border question. This issue has two dimensions. First, some-boundary specialists would argue that at the end of 1994, there were more than 100 disputed boundaries around the world. This is a vexed problem of the international community and there are no fixed ground rules for this. And these experts feel that after the 1958-59 India-China boundary talks, it became clear that this issue has no academic solution.
Second, India is not in a position to cede any territory to others except for a few kilometers this way or that. Therefore, to resolve the vexed boundary issue and establish cordial relations with India, China has to vacate the occupied territory.
In addition, both Jiang Zemin and Atal Behari Vajpayee are new to the centre of power in their respective countries.
Neither of them are charismatic personalities like Pandit Jawaharfal Nehru, Mrs. Indira Gandhi , Chairman Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. They have limited political clout in their respective countries. Therefore, to expect the governments of these two leaders to find a solution to the decades-old India-China boundary question is just not possible. Hence, status quo will continue and this may remain as one of the unresolved boundary questions, which will be carried into the 21st century.
Second is the economic cooperation between the two countries. Both China and India are developing countries, and each side enjoys some advantage over the other in trade. Incidentally, both are exporters of primary commodities and semi-manufactured goods. At the moment, in the international market, India enjoys a marginal advantage over China, because of its being a member of the World Trade Organisation.
Otherwise, both the economies are competing with each other in the international market. Therefore, the scope for a larger volume of India-China trade is rather slim. The existing volume of India-China trade at around $1 billion may at best grow into $4.5 billion by the turn of the century In percentage terms of foreign trade of India and China, this is less than one per cent of each country’s trade. I am not arguing against increasing trade between China and India. But as I mentioned earlier, the ground realities are different. Any expectation of faster growth of India-China trade is nothing but wishful thinking.
India-China joint ventures in third countries is once again a low feasibility proposition because of the reasons mentioned above.
Therefore, we can assume that in the immediate future, say in the next ten years, both sides should reconcile to the fact that the existing level of economic cooperation cannot be improved dramatically, and efforts to improve upon it may result in some changes, but marginally only. In fact, here one should also note that China is mixing politics with economics to a certain extent. For example, China would prefer the US to India in awarding a contract.
Lastly, the option to improve people-to-people level contacts between India and China. This, undoubtedly, is one area where more interaction can take place between the two countries. But, the spirit of Hindi-Chini Bhai Thai of the 1950s cannot stage a comeback for obvious reasons.
To conclude, for their own strategic interests, both China and India broke the impasse that had set into their relations from 1962 onwards, in the early l980s, and continued to do so even in the 1990s. The political leadership of both these nations have, over the last 15 years, evolved a mature relationship which is mutually beneficial. To take it beyond this level in the immediate future does not seem possible at this point of time. However, both nations would continue the existing level of relationship in future also in their own interest.
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