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Volume 20 - Issue 16, August 02 - 15, 2003
India's National Magazine
from the publishers of THE HINDU
Home • Contents
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THE STATES
A route of hope
NAUNIDHI KAUR
in Gangtok and Nathu La
The agreement with China to reopen border trade through Nathu La has raised hopes of an economic boom in Sikkim, but is the State ready to seize the opportunity?
NAUNIDHI KAUR
The barbed wire fence that marks the India-China border at Nathu La.
THE barbed wire fence at Nathu La that indicates India's border with China stands at the end of a narrow road. Controlled by the Army, the road does not allow at a time anything larger than a jeep. Army personnel restrict the inflow of tourist taxis, of which not more than 200 get permits to go up to Nathu La. For four decades after the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Nathu La has remained a no-no pass. It was thrown open to tourists a couple of years ago, but did not have much to offer them. There are no ceremonial rituals such as the one seen at the Wagah border post between India and Pakistan.
Now things have changed. Since Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced the opening of the historic Silk Route trade links through Nathu La, things have not been the same in Sikkim. In the official residence of Chief Minister Pawan Kumar Chamling, in the Legislative Assembly and even in restaurants in Gangtok, there is much expectation over how the State, which has been dependent on federal dole, will benefit from the decision.
Insiders claim that the State government never really expected its long-standing demand of opening of the Silk Route through Nathu La to materialise. However, reacting to the declaration, Chamling said: "Things are in place. Within two months we shall present a feasibility report to the Central government on what infrastructural development needs to be taken up in Sikkim for it to utilise effectively the benefits of the opening of the trade route through Nathu La." A high-level committee has been formed to prepare this report. At the top of the agenda is the development of a new township between 15 Mile and Tsomgo in order to create warehousing facilities. Another township will be developed between Ranka and Ranipool. Tsomgo, which is 17 km from Nathu La, at present is mostly constituted by small, makeshift shops, which cater to tourists. The State government plans to develop Tsomgo into a trading township. The first stop for traders who travel along the Silk Route will be Tsomgo. The joint declaration signed between India and China in June says that the Indian side agrees to "designate Tsomgo of Sikkim State" as the venue for the border market and that China will designate Renqinggang of the Tibet Autonomous Region as the border market on its side.
Chamling sees opportunities for Sikkim in the opening of the trade route. "It will generate employment in tourism- and transport-related businesses. Investors from industry and development organisations such as the World Bank will no doubt be attracted towards Sikkim. In order to maximise the benefits, the people of Sikkim will have to upgrade their capacity-building skills," he said.
The Sikkim government hopes to launch a bus service from Gangtok to Lhasa. It is also looking forward to infrastructural support from the Central government to upgrade the road to Nathu La into a motorable one. It has sinking zones and parts of it fall in landslide-prone areas. The fact that one climbs 9,000 feet (2,700 metres) within a distance of about 10 km gives an idea of the gradient of the road. However, the widening of roads might prove to be one of the easiest tasks before the government.
NAUNIDHI KAUR
Tsomgo, which is to be developed into a trading town, is now constituted mostly by makeshift shops that cater to tourists.
Optimistic Sikkimese business fora predict that regional exports to Sikkim would touch $203 million, with the cross-border sale of vegetables, oils and household items. Economic development of the region will now get an impetus, with a flourishing border trade. The Indian Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has predicted unprecedented economic development of the region, which includes the Greater Mekong region of Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Bangladesh, Bhutan and the Yunnan province of China. It predicts that Nathu La will provide the key connectivity to develop the trade bloc.
However, the ICC has based its predictions on some conditions. The northeastern States would have to tap the Chinese markets for their products and look at the Nathu La route as a more effective land route. These States would have to pull themselves up and effectively take on the challenge posed by the import of cheap Chinese goods. Secondly, India has to become a new source point for intermediary products, which could feed Chinese factories that produce manufactured goods. Thirdly, the northeastern region would have to push itself and become an agro export zone. Fourthly, partnerships and joint ventures would help in accessing markets of third countries such as Taiwan, Indochina, Japan and Korea by utilising the Chinese export marketing network. Lastly, tourism could thrive in the region with land routes readily available.
For all this to happen Sikkim will have to find the political will to change things. It would not only have to study how the region can develop in an integrated manner but also have to judge how serious the Central government is in bringing about some of the promised changes. A degree of sobriety is lent by the situation on the ground. More than 25 years after Sikkim's merger with the Indian Union, industry is still at a nascent stage in the State. In 1992, the existing industrial units provided employment to over 4,000 persons, hardly 1 per cent of the State's population. The reasons attributed to this poor performance are industrial sickness and governance-related distortions in the private sector. Entrepreneurs from outside the State find it difficult to furnish documents such as domicile residential certificates. Land laws in Sikkim do not allow the alienation of land. Poor social and industrial infrastructure, coupled with a lack of natural resources, has generated a cloud of gloom among the trading and entrepreneurial community. As of now, the State government is optimistic about exporting items such as organic cardamom and ginger, mango, local chilli and construction items to Tibet.
Much hope is pinned on tourism, which is expected to generate employment. Lukendra Rasaily, the secretary, Travel Agents' Association of Sikkim, said: "Working out the modalities of the trade would take a long time. Sikkim would benefit tremendously if the government opens a Buddhist circuit at the border, a combined tour of monasteries in Tibet and in India. The passage through Nathu La can be used for the Manasarovar Yatra." The mountain treks, picturesque lakes such as Tsomgo, and the rhododendrons of north Sikkim attract more than 12,000 foreign tourists and two lakh domestic tourists annually to the State. The tourism industry has led to the creation of jobs and boosted the economy over the past few years. "Most foreign tourists who want to go to Tibet go through Kathmandu. If we open the passage through Nathu La for tourism, at least 25 per cent of those tourists will pass through India. This will boost the local economy," Rasaily said.
The government will have to be proactive in monitoring and checking the movement of people across the border. The State government plans to set up a counter-intelligence service in the State Police Department.
A section of the Indian Army remains strongly opposed to the opening of the border, on strategic grounds. This section of the Army has expressed its concern over the construction of road, rail and air heads in the Tibet Autonomous Region. It fears that the ongoing 1,118-km railway project to link Gormo in China's Qinghai province with Lhasa in Tibet will enhance the induction and sustenance capability of Chinese troops in Tibet. This railway line, which costs a whopping $27.2 billion, will connect Lhasa with four major Chinese centres. This highly reliable and versatile network of defence feeder railway lines from mainland China up to the international border with India has put India's defence establishment on high alert. Two former Prime Ministers, P.V. Narasimha Rao and H.D. Deve Gowda, had rejected proposals to open the trade route.
NAUNIDHI KAUR
The lake at Tsomgo, a tourist attraction.
The issue gets complicated further given the presence of Tibetans in Sikkim. If the opening of the trade route is being seen as de jure acceptance by China that Sikkim is a part of India, then Tibet has also been accepted by India as being a part of China. Tibetan organisations and the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamshala in Himachal Pradesh have protested against the move. In Sikkim, the reaction from the 6,000-strong Tibetan community has been much more subdued. There have been no demonstrations or written petitions.
The majority of Tibetans in Sikkim are second-generation migrants. Although they live in Sikkim as refugees, they are fairly integrated into Sikkimese society as a result of inter-marriages and trade links in the local Sikkimese community. T.Y.C. Jimba Phuntosk, president of the Tibetan Youth Club, a civic group which has been demanding the complete independence of Tibet, said: "We are aware of the laws and will not go against them. At the same time we would like to sound a word of caution against China."
To what extent does the acceptance of trade through Nathu La mean that China has accepted Sikkim to be a part of India? Has the opening of the trade route resulted in China's de jure acceptance of Sikkim's 1975 accession to India? Said Chamling: "China can say what it wants to. As the Chief Minister of Sikkim and as its representative, I have always maintained that Sikkim is an integral part of India. We are the only State to join India through a referendum." Chamling lays stress on Sikkim's "reverse integration" with India. It is also not uncommon to come across graffiti like "Kanchenjunga to Kanyakumari: One India" in Sikkim. All these are subtle though effective indicators of Sikkim's integration with India.
At the diplomatic level, however, the dominant opinion is that the meeting between the Indian Prime Minister and his Chinese counterpart has not resolved the issue of Sikkim's integration with India. Differences over semantics have ensured that nothing concrete has come out on paper. Although the talks have not resulted in any solution, there is a reduction in the level of the dispute between China and India on the recognition of Sikkim as being a part of India. The Sikkim government has urged the Central government to include representatives from Sikkim in the committee that has been set up by India and China to resolve the border disputes.
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Tuesday, October 19, 2010
Sunday, January 3, 2010
CHINA BECOMING A SUPERPOWER
AND INDIA'S OPTIONS
by Sreedhar
A general impression going around amongst the Indian strategic community is that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is becoming superpower in the next 20 years. It may even offer a challenge to the US by that time. It is further argued that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is going to be a formidable force in the years to come because of the ongoing modernisation plans. Some even argue that now is the correct time to resolve the Sino-Indian border question and establish cordial relations as quickly as possible with China. Whatever may be reasons for this Indian mindset, whether it was the 1962 debacle or the 1964 Chinese nuclear explosion, these arguments need a closer examination.
The Wars the PLA Fought
Korean War of 1950-51
Before we examine Sino-Indian relations, the first question that needs to be asked is whether the PLA is really militarily so superior as compared to the Indian armed forces or not? A close scrutiny of the PLA’s performance during the past 47 years indicates that at every given opportunity, the PLA flexed its muscle and its performance can best be described as a mixed kitty. During the late Chairman Mao’s years, the PLA went into action five times - three times to fight a war with neighbours, once to fight the US “imperialism” and once to occupy the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. The first was in 1950-Y when the PL4 clashed with the US forces in the Korean Peninsula. Whatever may be the claims made by the Chinese, the PLA was defeated and suffered heavy casualties. Many would argue that the technological superiority of the US armed forces played a decisive role in the defeat of the PLA.
Sino-Idian War of 1962
A decade later, after the failure of Chairman Mao’s Great Leap Forward Programme, in October 1962, China decided to resolve the Sino-Indian border issue by the use of force. In October 1962, the PLA moved in swiftly, defeated the Indian Army and declared unilateral ceasefire after taking possession of approximately 30,000 sq km of Indian territory. Though no official history of the war from the Indian side has been published as yet, the Chinese official version is that they repulsed the Indian attack on Chinese territory. Various versions of the people associated with that war from the Indian side, however, indicate that the Chinese succeeded largely due to the failure of the politico-military leadership of India to assess correctly the PLA’s capabilities. Way back in 1974 itself, people like K. Subrahmanyam, who were associated with China during that crucial period in India’s Ministry of Defence, argued that had the Indian Air Force been pressed into action, the course of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 would have been different. In fact, at the time of the war itself elder statesman of India, C. Rajagopalachari, advocated the deployment of the Air Force by India to destroy the supply lines of the Chinese Army.
Nathu La of 1967
Three years later, in 1965, two significant events took place on the Sine-Indian border. The first was the warning issued to India about Chinese sheep not being allowed to graze on their side of the border by India. This happened in September 1965 when the Indo-Pak war was simmering on India’s western border.
At the same time, in September-December 1965, the PLA sent probing missions on the entire Sikkim-Tibet border. According to one account, there were seven border intrusions on the Sikkim-Tibet border between September 7 and December 12, 1965, involving the PLA. In all these border incursions, the Indian side responded “firmly” without provoking the other. Though details of casualties of these PLA border incursions are not reported, there were reports indicating that the PLA suffered “heavy” casualties against “moderate” loss by India.
Two years later, in September 1967, in spite of their setbacks in 1965, the PLA launched a direct attack on the lndian armed forces at Nathu La, on the Sikkim-Tibet border. The six-day “border skirmishes” from September 7-6 to 13, 1967, had all the elements of a high drama, including exchange of heavy artillery fire, and the PLA soldiers tried to cross the border in large numbers.
The attack was repulsed at all points, According to an account of this incident, from the details of the fighting available, it appeared the Chinese had received a severe mauling in the artillery duels across the barbed wire fence. Indian gunners scored several direct hits on Chinese bunkers, including a command post from where the Chinese operations were being directed. The Chinese were also known to have suffered at least twice as many casualties as the Indians in this encounter between Indian and Chinese armed forces.
The important point to be remembered in this context is that the late Chairman Mao launched his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) in 1965 and it reached its peak in 1967 to weed out all ‘anti-socialist elements” from the Chinese polity. Though many Sinologists would not like to describe the GPCR in any other manner, for an outsider like me, it was essentially a power struggle between Chairman Mao and his adversaries.
However, for the purposes of this essay, three significant things emerged from the Nathu La episode on the Sikkim-Tibet border. First, the Indian armed forces demonstrated beyond doubt that the PLA is not as strong and motivated as it was made out to be. In fact, there were rumours, around September 10, 1967, that the PLA was planning to bring in the Air Force to escalate the conflict. Sensing that the Indians were getting ready for such an eventuality, the Chinese official news agency, Xinhua, denied having any such plans.
Second, the Indian politico-military leadership quickly realised this myth about the PLA. This was clearly reflected in the unconditional ceasefire proposed by India in a note delivered to the Chinese on September 12, 1967, all along the Sikkim-Tibet border from 05.30 hrs on September 13. Though officially, the Chinese rejected this unilateral ceasefire offer by India, except for an occasional salvo by the PLA on September 13, 1967, there was a lull all along the border. Many observers felt India scored a psychological victory over the Chinese for the latter’s unilateral ceasefire in 1962.
Lastly, the Indian political leadership also realised that the PLA’s behavioural pattern on the border had something to do with the domestic turmoil then going on in China.
Ussuri Clashes of 1969
By March 1969, the GPCR entered its final phase and at that time the PLA decided that it could decide the border with the former Soviet Union by the use of force. On March 2-3, 1969, there were “border skirmishes” in the area of the Nizhnemikhallovka border post on the Ussuri River. The intruding PLA men were confronted by the Soviet Red Army and their attack was repulsed.
Again, on March 15, 1969, the PLA launched a fresh attack with an infantry regiment strength (estimated to be 2,000 men) with support units at Damansky Island on the Ussuri River. According to the details of the war available, initially the Chinese succeeded in penetrating the island under cover of artillery and mortar fire from their side of the river. But a massive retaliation by the Red Army made the PLA beat a hasty retreat.
Like they had to bring in the Air Force to meet the Indian armed forces’ challenge, this time too, the PLA is reported to have “activated” their North China Sea fleet, but nothing happened; it turned out to be an empty threat.
Again there were border skirmishes in August 1969 in the Xinjiang sector of the Sino-Soviet border between the PLA and the Red Army.
It is a part of history now that the PLA could not take on the Red Army and the Chinese were forced to come to the conference table to resolve the issue through peaceful negotiations.
Capturing of paracle Island in 1974
After the end of the GPCR in 1969.70, it is still a debatable question, whether Chairman Mao eliminated all his adversaries or not, but radical changes came into the structure and hierarchy of the PLA. Apparently the aging Chairman Mao, in a swift move, ordered the PLA to go and capture the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. With the ongoing conflict in Indo-China al that time, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Vietnam. who also claimed part of these islands, did not offer any resistance to the PLA’s occupation of the islands.
Virtually without firing a shot, the PLA had a total success in this operation.
An assessment of these five PLA actions indicates that it had a total success in two operations and suffered defeat on three other occasions. The PLA success story is also due to the timing of the campaign like in the Paracel Islands. Whenever the PLA confronted an adversary without any element of surprise, or an adversary who challenged them, its performance was poor. This was obvious from the Korean war, and the Nathu La and Ussrui incidents. In fact, in the Nathu La and Ussuri incidents, the PLA did not offer even stiff resistance. From all accounts, it made a hasty retreat the instant the adversary offered stiff resistance or acted “decisively”.
All these five actions of the PLA also clearly indicate three things: (a) the late Chairman Mao, wanted to consolidate his country’s boundaries as quickly as possible, and in that exercise, advantage China should be the guiding principle; (b) also, he pressed the PLA into action, whenever his plans to accelerate the peace of economic developments failed; and (c) in all these wars/engagements, the PL4 was not as professional as it was made out to be.
Sino-Vietnam War of 1979
In the post-Mao period, after the initial years’ power struggle was over and Deng Xiaoping managed to place himself firmly in the saddle, he too looked to the PLA to resolve the outstanding claims of China on its borders. The first was, of course, the now famous February 1979 war with Vietnam. Deng wanted “to teach a lesson” to the Vietnamese. In that Sine-Vietnam war, the PLA was badly mauled and forced to retreat. The battlehardened Vietnamese with better strategy and motivation were able to take on the PLA and inflict heavy casualties. According to one strategic commentator, The only thing the Chinese are not interested to discuss is the Sino-Vietnam war of 1979.”
Deng realised that there was need to improve the technological superiority of the PLA. Consequently, the military modernisation segment of the Four Modernisations Programme (the other three being agriculture, industry, and science and technology) was acelerated. Accordingly, we notice greater allocations for defence in the Chinese budget since then.
Sumdorong Cho Valley incident of 1985
Six and half years later, Deng decided to flex China’s muscles again with India. In mid-1986, it came to the notice of India that the PLA had built a helipad at Wandung in Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. India reacted swiftly and the PLA had an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the India Army in Sumdorong Chu Valley of Arunchal Pradesh in August 1986. After a week of tense moments both sides mutually agreed to withdraw their forces inside their respective territories and create a no man’s land. The Chinese posture at that time clearly indicated that Beijing quickly realised that 1962 cannot be repeated. Afterwards, we saw some writings in the PLA’s official organ, Liberation Army Daily, about the professionalism the Indian armed forces.
Sine-Vietnam Clashes in the South China Sea
Called the Truong Sa Archipelago by Vietnam, and the Nansha Islands by China, the Spratlys consist of about 150 reefs, sandbanks and islands in the South China Sea, 350 km from Vietnam’s coast and 1,000 km tram China. They straddle busy shipping lanes and are, therefore, strategically important. In addition, the preliminary geological surveys have shown that this area has vast deposits of crude oil and natural gas.
Both China and Vietnam claimed the Spratlys for centuries, but up to 1987 had been content with a war of words. However, from early 1967 onwards, the Chinese started putting markers on some of these islands, making it clear that they had asserted their sovereignty over them. Simultaneously, the PLA also started strengthening its presence and started conducting naval exercises in and around the Spratlys.
This brought a sharp reaction from Vietnam and in the subsequent protest notes exchanged, both sides accused each other of provocation, and claimed that the other side would bear the responsibility and consequences of its actions.
On March 14,1988, the PLA’s Navy clashed with the Vietnamese Navy for the first time. Though it was a very short confrontation, both sides suffered considerable casualties. But the tension continued up to the end of the month. In late March 1988, the war-weary Vietnam proposed bilateral talks with China to resolve the issue. As usual, the Chinese rejected the offer initially, but later agreed to the Vietnamese proposal.
However, fresh tensions erupted in May 1992, when the Chinese authorities leased an oil concession to an American Firm, Creston Energy, for oil exploration in and around the Spratlys, and Vietnam took strong objection to it.
From 1993 onwards, both China and Vietnam realised that they could not resolve the issue militarily and started negotiations.
Invincible PLA ?
Like Mao, Deng also tried to use the PLA to settle the border issues by use of force but had no success. With the Deng era coming to an end, what his successors would do can only be a matter of speculation. They may or may not continue this policy of using force to settle the “Middle Kingdwn’s” boundades.
But the lessons others can draw from the PLA’s past engagements is that the PLA’s conventional armed forces are not an invincible force as they are being made out to be by a section of the Indian strategic community. As far as China’s nuclear capabilities are concerned, the Chinese have given a solemn undertaking to the international community that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. And the doyen of India’s nuclear programme, Dr. Raja Ramanna, in October 1996, observed that the country has acquired the nuclear weapon manufacturing capability. In other words, we have the needed nuclear deterrent capability.
The other aspect of the PLA is its equipment. Right from the liberation of mainland China in October 1949, the Chinese strongly believed in self-reliance. At the height of the Sine-Soviet friendship, in the early 1950s, a considerable amount of Soviet technology was transferred to China. One can say that the Chinese arms industry was built on this in the subsequent years. The Soviet technology stopped coming from the mid-1950s onwards. With the embargo and containment policy of the West up to 1971, the Chinese arms industry, it is generally agreed upon by China watchers, remained, more or less, stagnant.
In other words, for about 16-17 years, China had no access to any rapidly changing conventional arms technology in the international arms market. In addition, how much the social engineering experiments of the late Chairman Mao affected the overall technological standards in the PLA and outside is a debatable question. Some Western scholars have observed that the PLA was insulated against the social upheavals created by the late Chairman Mao. Still, at least two generations of young people were affected by Chairman Mao’s experiments in the 1950s and 1960s. This must have automatically resulted in a low level of technological base in the Chinese society. It certainly affected the civil sector, We can see this by the low quality of Chinese consumer products. And, therefore, its impact on the arms industry cannot be ruled out.
Whatever may be the actual position, there has been a scramble for weapon related technology since 1971, from the international market by China - how much they are able to absorb is an open ended question and can be debated.
The performance of the equipment the Chinese are selling in the international market leaves much to be desired. For instance, some of the biggest recipients of Chinese arms like Pakistan, North Korea and Iran have bought this equipment as a last choice, when it was denied to them from others or they were cash starved. In fact, the Pakistani arms acquisition pattern over the years indicates that their first preference is arms from the West and the last choice is China. This is in spite of an indepth relationship with China, and the fact that Chinese equipment is cheap and available on easy credit.
In this part of the world, the Chinese equipment saw action in war in recent years only in the Iraq-Iran war of the 1990s. The Iranians used the Silkworm missiles from China quite successfully to confront Iraq, but in the later stages of the war only, when Iraqi ammunition was almost depleted.
Therefore, one need not be unduly alarmed at the technological level of the PLA’s weapon systems.
Myth of Economic Miracle
The other myth that is perpetuated by a group of China watchers is that Beijing is likely to become an economic superpower in the next two decades, that is, by about 2015 or so. And to support their argument, the World Bank report on China and the Economist (London) are liberally quoted. One is tempted to compare this Chinese miracle with the 1970s’ assessments of the West about China’s crude oil reserves, There used to be screaming headlines in the mid-1970s in the Western Press saying that China’s crude oil reserves are bigger than Saudi Arabia’s, We, at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, were the first to question these assessments, and the late Mr. Mirchandani, then General Manager of the United News of India promptly carried it on his wire services, Within a few months, that bubble burst.
The Chinese economy witnessed some spectacular development (but not development in the broad sense of the term, that is economic, cultural, social, etc, which India is attempting) of 10-t 1 per cent growth in recent years. This has been achieved largely due to heavy doses of foreign investment. Here one should not forget the fact that the foreign investor will continue to make investments only if his profits are assured. One more factor needs to be borne in mind here, international capital has no nationality and concepts like nationalism and patriotism have no relevance to it. The overseas Chinese who made the bulk of investments in China may not continue to do so. Already reports are appearing in the international media that investors in China are not happy with their returns and are looking for greener pastures. This means that the flow of foreign investments into China is going to slow down in the years to come. And in the long run, the Chinese economy may have to settle down for a 5-6 per cent growth rate. Anything beyond that requires at least a couple of trillion dollars of investments in the next two to three decades, First, that type of capital is not available in the international capital market. The $80 billion foreign investment of the past decade created such regional and social imbalances in China that the Chinese authorities have been forced to take a fresh look at the process of liberalisation of the economy.
Therefore, in these circumstances, China becoming an economic superpower, say in the next 20 years, can at best be described as wishful thinking by members of a China admirers’ club. And, in fact, a couple of Chinese scholars with whom I interacted with in 1993 were surprised at these assessments. They said that like in any planned economy, they too fixed some target; and if they can achieve even 50 per cent of those targets, they would consider their planning process successful. This is understandable. In fact, any student of economics will be able to tell that a developing country with a population of one billion plus cannot sustain a 10-l 1 per cent growth rate for too long.
Indian Policy Options
It is in this backdrop that we must examine India’s policy options vis-a-vis China in the short and medium terms. To discuss long term perspectives at this stage is not feasible as there are so many imponderables.
At one level, the current phase of Sir-m-Indian relations started some time in the early 1980s by the late Indian Prime Minsister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, progressed satisfactorily, except for the 1985 aberration mentioned earlier. In fact, from 1987 onwards, efforts were on from both sides to ensure that 1995 is not repeated. Both sides took a number of confidence building measures, including high level political visits, armed forces to armed forces contacts, dialogue at various levels, etc. The Sine Indian joint working group has been meeting regularly. Even the bilateral trade which was at a low level, started picking up. In other words, both India and China have engaged themselves in a constructive dialogue which proved to be mutually beneficial.
Can we take this relationship forward? This is the question haunting many policy analysts. In this context, one needs to look into three broad ‘areas. Foremost among them is the border question. This issue has two dimensions. First, some-boundary specialists would argue that at the end of 1994, there were more than 100 disputed boundaries around the world. This is a vexed problem of the international community and there are no fixed ground rules for this. And these experts feel that after the 1958-59 India-China boundary talks, it became clear that this issue has no academic solution.
Second, India is not in a position to cede any territory to others except for a few kilometers this way or that. Therefore, to resolve the vexed boundary issue and establish cordial relations with India, China has to vacate the occupied territory.
In addition, both Jiang Zemin and Atal Behari Vajpayee are new to the centre of power in their respective countries.
Neither of them are charismatic personalities like Pandit Jawaharfal Nehru, Mrs. Indira Gandhi , Chairman Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. They have limited political clout in their respective countries. Therefore, to expect the governments of these two leaders to find a solution to the decades-old India-China boundary question is just not possible. Hence, status quo will continue and this may remain as one of the unresolved boundary questions, which will be carried into the 21st century.
Second is the economic cooperation between the two countries. Both China and India are developing countries, and each side enjoys some advantage over the other in trade. Incidentally, both are exporters of primary commodities and semi-manufactured goods. At the moment, in the international market, India enjoys a marginal advantage over China, because of its being a member of the World Trade Organisation.
Otherwise, both the economies are competing with each other in the international market. Therefore, the scope for a larger volume of India-China trade is rather slim. The existing volume of India-China trade at around $1 billion may at best grow into $4.5 billion by the turn of the century In percentage terms of foreign trade of India and China, this is less than one per cent of each country’s trade. I am not arguing against increasing trade between China and India. But as I mentioned earlier, the ground realities are different. Any expectation of faster growth of India-China trade is nothing but wishful thinking.
India-China joint ventures in third countries is once again a low feasibility proposition because of the reasons mentioned above.
Therefore, we can assume that in the immediate future, say in the next ten years, both sides should reconcile to the fact that the existing level of economic cooperation cannot be improved dramatically, and efforts to improve upon it may result in some changes, but marginally only. In fact, here one should also note that China is mixing politics with economics to a certain extent. For example, China would prefer the US to India in awarding a contract.
Lastly, the option to improve people-to-people level contacts between India and China. This, undoubtedly, is one area where more interaction can take place between the two countries. But, the spirit of Hindi-Chini Bhai Thai of the 1950s cannot stage a comeback for obvious reasons.
To conclude, for their own strategic interests, both China and India broke the impasse that had set into their relations from 1962 onwards, in the early l980s, and continued to do so even in the 1990s. The political leadership of both these nations have, over the last 15 years, evolved a mature relationship which is mutually beneficial. To take it beyond this level in the immediate future does not seem possible at this point of time. However, both nations would continue the existing level of relationship in future also in their own interest.
AND INDIA'S OPTIONS
by Sreedhar
A general impression going around amongst the Indian strategic community is that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is becoming superpower in the next 20 years. It may even offer a challenge to the US by that time. It is further argued that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is going to be a formidable force in the years to come because of the ongoing modernisation plans. Some even argue that now is the correct time to resolve the Sino-Indian border question and establish cordial relations as quickly as possible with China. Whatever may be reasons for this Indian mindset, whether it was the 1962 debacle or the 1964 Chinese nuclear explosion, these arguments need a closer examination.
The Wars the PLA Fought
Korean War of 1950-51
Before we examine Sino-Indian relations, the first question that needs to be asked is whether the PLA is really militarily so superior as compared to the Indian armed forces or not? A close scrutiny of the PLA’s performance during the past 47 years indicates that at every given opportunity, the PLA flexed its muscle and its performance can best be described as a mixed kitty. During the late Chairman Mao’s years, the PLA went into action five times - three times to fight a war with neighbours, once to fight the US “imperialism” and once to occupy the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. The first was in 1950-Y when the PL4 clashed with the US forces in the Korean Peninsula. Whatever may be the claims made by the Chinese, the PLA was defeated and suffered heavy casualties. Many would argue that the technological superiority of the US armed forces played a decisive role in the defeat of the PLA.
Sino-Idian War of 1962
A decade later, after the failure of Chairman Mao’s Great Leap Forward Programme, in October 1962, China decided to resolve the Sino-Indian border issue by the use of force. In October 1962, the PLA moved in swiftly, defeated the Indian Army and declared unilateral ceasefire after taking possession of approximately 30,000 sq km of Indian territory. Though no official history of the war from the Indian side has been published as yet, the Chinese official version is that they repulsed the Indian attack on Chinese territory. Various versions of the people associated with that war from the Indian side, however, indicate that the Chinese succeeded largely due to the failure of the politico-military leadership of India to assess correctly the PLA’s capabilities. Way back in 1974 itself, people like K. Subrahmanyam, who were associated with China during that crucial period in India’s Ministry of Defence, argued that had the Indian Air Force been pressed into action, the course of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 would have been different. In fact, at the time of the war itself elder statesman of India, C. Rajagopalachari, advocated the deployment of the Air Force by India to destroy the supply lines of the Chinese Army.
Nathu La of 1967
Three years later, in 1965, two significant events took place on the Sine-Indian border. The first was the warning issued to India about Chinese sheep not being allowed to graze on their side of the border by India. This happened in September 1965 when the Indo-Pak war was simmering on India’s western border.
At the same time, in September-December 1965, the PLA sent probing missions on the entire Sikkim-Tibet border. According to one account, there were seven border intrusions on the Sikkim-Tibet border between September 7 and December 12, 1965, involving the PLA. In all these border incursions, the Indian side responded “firmly” without provoking the other. Though details of casualties of these PLA border incursions are not reported, there were reports indicating that the PLA suffered “heavy” casualties against “moderate” loss by India.
Two years later, in September 1967, in spite of their setbacks in 1965, the PLA launched a direct attack on the lndian armed forces at Nathu La, on the Sikkim-Tibet border. The six-day “border skirmishes” from September 7-6 to 13, 1967, had all the elements of a high drama, including exchange of heavy artillery fire, and the PLA soldiers tried to cross the border in large numbers.
The attack was repulsed at all points, According to an account of this incident, from the details of the fighting available, it appeared the Chinese had received a severe mauling in the artillery duels across the barbed wire fence. Indian gunners scored several direct hits on Chinese bunkers, including a command post from where the Chinese operations were being directed. The Chinese were also known to have suffered at least twice as many casualties as the Indians in this encounter between Indian and Chinese armed forces.
The important point to be remembered in this context is that the late Chairman Mao launched his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) in 1965 and it reached its peak in 1967 to weed out all ‘anti-socialist elements” from the Chinese polity. Though many Sinologists would not like to describe the GPCR in any other manner, for an outsider like me, it was essentially a power struggle between Chairman Mao and his adversaries.
However, for the purposes of this essay, three significant things emerged from the Nathu La episode on the Sikkim-Tibet border. First, the Indian armed forces demonstrated beyond doubt that the PLA is not as strong and motivated as it was made out to be. In fact, there were rumours, around September 10, 1967, that the PLA was planning to bring in the Air Force to escalate the conflict. Sensing that the Indians were getting ready for such an eventuality, the Chinese official news agency, Xinhua, denied having any such plans.
Second, the Indian politico-military leadership quickly realised this myth about the PLA. This was clearly reflected in the unconditional ceasefire proposed by India in a note delivered to the Chinese on September 12, 1967, all along the Sikkim-Tibet border from 05.30 hrs on September 13. Though officially, the Chinese rejected this unilateral ceasefire offer by India, except for an occasional salvo by the PLA on September 13, 1967, there was a lull all along the border. Many observers felt India scored a psychological victory over the Chinese for the latter’s unilateral ceasefire in 1962.
Lastly, the Indian political leadership also realised that the PLA’s behavioural pattern on the border had something to do with the domestic turmoil then going on in China.
Ussuri Clashes of 1969
By March 1969, the GPCR entered its final phase and at that time the PLA decided that it could decide the border with the former Soviet Union by the use of force. On March 2-3, 1969, there were “border skirmishes” in the area of the Nizhnemikhallovka border post on the Ussuri River. The intruding PLA men were confronted by the Soviet Red Army and their attack was repulsed.
Again, on March 15, 1969, the PLA launched a fresh attack with an infantry regiment strength (estimated to be 2,000 men) with support units at Damansky Island on the Ussuri River. According to the details of the war available, initially the Chinese succeeded in penetrating the island under cover of artillery and mortar fire from their side of the river. But a massive retaliation by the Red Army made the PLA beat a hasty retreat.
Like they had to bring in the Air Force to meet the Indian armed forces’ challenge, this time too, the PLA is reported to have “activated” their North China Sea fleet, but nothing happened; it turned out to be an empty threat.
Again there were border skirmishes in August 1969 in the Xinjiang sector of the Sino-Soviet border between the PLA and the Red Army.
It is a part of history now that the PLA could not take on the Red Army and the Chinese were forced to come to the conference table to resolve the issue through peaceful negotiations.
Capturing of paracle Island in 1974
After the end of the GPCR in 1969.70, it is still a debatable question, whether Chairman Mao eliminated all his adversaries or not, but radical changes came into the structure and hierarchy of the PLA. Apparently the aging Chairman Mao, in a swift move, ordered the PLA to go and capture the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. With the ongoing conflict in Indo-China al that time, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Vietnam. who also claimed part of these islands, did not offer any resistance to the PLA’s occupation of the islands.
Virtually without firing a shot, the PLA had a total success in this operation.
An assessment of these five PLA actions indicates that it had a total success in two operations and suffered defeat on three other occasions. The PLA success story is also due to the timing of the campaign like in the Paracel Islands. Whenever the PLA confronted an adversary without any element of surprise, or an adversary who challenged them, its performance was poor. This was obvious from the Korean war, and the Nathu La and Ussrui incidents. In fact, in the Nathu La and Ussuri incidents, the PLA did not offer even stiff resistance. From all accounts, it made a hasty retreat the instant the adversary offered stiff resistance or acted “decisively”.
All these five actions of the PLA also clearly indicate three things: (a) the late Chairman Mao, wanted to consolidate his country’s boundaries as quickly as possible, and in that exercise, advantage China should be the guiding principle; (b) also, he pressed the PLA into action, whenever his plans to accelerate the peace of economic developments failed; and (c) in all these wars/engagements, the PL4 was not as professional as it was made out to be.
Sino-Vietnam War of 1979
In the post-Mao period, after the initial years’ power struggle was over and Deng Xiaoping managed to place himself firmly in the saddle, he too looked to the PLA to resolve the outstanding claims of China on its borders. The first was, of course, the now famous February 1979 war with Vietnam. Deng wanted “to teach a lesson” to the Vietnamese. In that Sine-Vietnam war, the PLA was badly mauled and forced to retreat. The battlehardened Vietnamese with better strategy and motivation were able to take on the PLA and inflict heavy casualties. According to one strategic commentator, The only thing the Chinese are not interested to discuss is the Sino-Vietnam war of 1979.”
Deng realised that there was need to improve the technological superiority of the PLA. Consequently, the military modernisation segment of the Four Modernisations Programme (the other three being agriculture, industry, and science and technology) was acelerated. Accordingly, we notice greater allocations for defence in the Chinese budget since then.
Sumdorong Cho Valley incident of 1985
Six and half years later, Deng decided to flex China’s muscles again with India. In mid-1986, it came to the notice of India that the PLA had built a helipad at Wandung in Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. India reacted swiftly and the PLA had an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the India Army in Sumdorong Chu Valley of Arunchal Pradesh in August 1986. After a week of tense moments both sides mutually agreed to withdraw their forces inside their respective territories and create a no man’s land. The Chinese posture at that time clearly indicated that Beijing quickly realised that 1962 cannot be repeated. Afterwards, we saw some writings in the PLA’s official organ, Liberation Army Daily, about the professionalism the Indian armed forces.
Sine-Vietnam Clashes in the South China Sea
Called the Truong Sa Archipelago by Vietnam, and the Nansha Islands by China, the Spratlys consist of about 150 reefs, sandbanks and islands in the South China Sea, 350 km from Vietnam’s coast and 1,000 km tram China. They straddle busy shipping lanes and are, therefore, strategically important. In addition, the preliminary geological surveys have shown that this area has vast deposits of crude oil and natural gas.
Both China and Vietnam claimed the Spratlys for centuries, but up to 1987 had been content with a war of words. However, from early 1967 onwards, the Chinese started putting markers on some of these islands, making it clear that they had asserted their sovereignty over them. Simultaneously, the PLA also started strengthening its presence and started conducting naval exercises in and around the Spratlys.
This brought a sharp reaction from Vietnam and in the subsequent protest notes exchanged, both sides accused each other of provocation, and claimed that the other side would bear the responsibility and consequences of its actions.
On March 14,1988, the PLA’s Navy clashed with the Vietnamese Navy for the first time. Though it was a very short confrontation, both sides suffered considerable casualties. But the tension continued up to the end of the month. In late March 1988, the war-weary Vietnam proposed bilateral talks with China to resolve the issue. As usual, the Chinese rejected the offer initially, but later agreed to the Vietnamese proposal.
However, fresh tensions erupted in May 1992, when the Chinese authorities leased an oil concession to an American Firm, Creston Energy, for oil exploration in and around the Spratlys, and Vietnam took strong objection to it.
From 1993 onwards, both China and Vietnam realised that they could not resolve the issue militarily and started negotiations.
Invincible PLA ?
Like Mao, Deng also tried to use the PLA to settle the border issues by use of force but had no success. With the Deng era coming to an end, what his successors would do can only be a matter of speculation. They may or may not continue this policy of using force to settle the “Middle Kingdwn’s” boundades.
But the lessons others can draw from the PLA’s past engagements is that the PLA’s conventional armed forces are not an invincible force as they are being made out to be by a section of the Indian strategic community. As far as China’s nuclear capabilities are concerned, the Chinese have given a solemn undertaking to the international community that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. And the doyen of India’s nuclear programme, Dr. Raja Ramanna, in October 1996, observed that the country has acquired the nuclear weapon manufacturing capability. In other words, we have the needed nuclear deterrent capability.
The other aspect of the PLA is its equipment. Right from the liberation of mainland China in October 1949, the Chinese strongly believed in self-reliance. At the height of the Sine-Soviet friendship, in the early 1950s, a considerable amount of Soviet technology was transferred to China. One can say that the Chinese arms industry was built on this in the subsequent years. The Soviet technology stopped coming from the mid-1950s onwards. With the embargo and containment policy of the West up to 1971, the Chinese arms industry, it is generally agreed upon by China watchers, remained, more or less, stagnant.
In other words, for about 16-17 years, China had no access to any rapidly changing conventional arms technology in the international arms market. In addition, how much the social engineering experiments of the late Chairman Mao affected the overall technological standards in the PLA and outside is a debatable question. Some Western scholars have observed that the PLA was insulated against the social upheavals created by the late Chairman Mao. Still, at least two generations of young people were affected by Chairman Mao’s experiments in the 1950s and 1960s. This must have automatically resulted in a low level of technological base in the Chinese society. It certainly affected the civil sector, We can see this by the low quality of Chinese consumer products. And, therefore, its impact on the arms industry cannot be ruled out.
Whatever may be the actual position, there has been a scramble for weapon related technology since 1971, from the international market by China - how much they are able to absorb is an open ended question and can be debated.
The performance of the equipment the Chinese are selling in the international market leaves much to be desired. For instance, some of the biggest recipients of Chinese arms like Pakistan, North Korea and Iran have bought this equipment as a last choice, when it was denied to them from others or they were cash starved. In fact, the Pakistani arms acquisition pattern over the years indicates that their first preference is arms from the West and the last choice is China. This is in spite of an indepth relationship with China, and the fact that Chinese equipment is cheap and available on easy credit.
In this part of the world, the Chinese equipment saw action in war in recent years only in the Iraq-Iran war of the 1990s. The Iranians used the Silkworm missiles from China quite successfully to confront Iraq, but in the later stages of the war only, when Iraqi ammunition was almost depleted.
Therefore, one need not be unduly alarmed at the technological level of the PLA’s weapon systems.
Myth of Economic Miracle
The other myth that is perpetuated by a group of China watchers is that Beijing is likely to become an economic superpower in the next two decades, that is, by about 2015 or so. And to support their argument, the World Bank report on China and the Economist (London) are liberally quoted. One is tempted to compare this Chinese miracle with the 1970s’ assessments of the West about China’s crude oil reserves, There used to be screaming headlines in the mid-1970s in the Western Press saying that China’s crude oil reserves are bigger than Saudi Arabia’s, We, at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, were the first to question these assessments, and the late Mr. Mirchandani, then General Manager of the United News of India promptly carried it on his wire services, Within a few months, that bubble burst.
The Chinese economy witnessed some spectacular development (but not development in the broad sense of the term, that is economic, cultural, social, etc, which India is attempting) of 10-t 1 per cent growth in recent years. This has been achieved largely due to heavy doses of foreign investment. Here one should not forget the fact that the foreign investor will continue to make investments only if his profits are assured. One more factor needs to be borne in mind here, international capital has no nationality and concepts like nationalism and patriotism have no relevance to it. The overseas Chinese who made the bulk of investments in China may not continue to do so. Already reports are appearing in the international media that investors in China are not happy with their returns and are looking for greener pastures. This means that the flow of foreign investments into China is going to slow down in the years to come. And in the long run, the Chinese economy may have to settle down for a 5-6 per cent growth rate. Anything beyond that requires at least a couple of trillion dollars of investments in the next two to three decades, First, that type of capital is not available in the international capital market. The $80 billion foreign investment of the past decade created such regional and social imbalances in China that the Chinese authorities have been forced to take a fresh look at the process of liberalisation of the economy.
Therefore, in these circumstances, China becoming an economic superpower, say in the next 20 years, can at best be described as wishful thinking by members of a China admirers’ club. And, in fact, a couple of Chinese scholars with whom I interacted with in 1993 were surprised at these assessments. They said that like in any planned economy, they too fixed some target; and if they can achieve even 50 per cent of those targets, they would consider their planning process successful. This is understandable. In fact, any student of economics will be able to tell that a developing country with a population of one billion plus cannot sustain a 10-l 1 per cent growth rate for too long.
Indian Policy Options
It is in this backdrop that we must examine India’s policy options vis-a-vis China in the short and medium terms. To discuss long term perspectives at this stage is not feasible as there are so many imponderables.
At one level, the current phase of Sir-m-Indian relations started some time in the early 1980s by the late Indian Prime Minsister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, progressed satisfactorily, except for the 1985 aberration mentioned earlier. In fact, from 1987 onwards, efforts were on from both sides to ensure that 1995 is not repeated. Both sides took a number of confidence building measures, including high level political visits, armed forces to armed forces contacts, dialogue at various levels, etc. The Sine Indian joint working group has been meeting regularly. Even the bilateral trade which was at a low level, started picking up. In other words, both India and China have engaged themselves in a constructive dialogue which proved to be mutually beneficial.
Can we take this relationship forward? This is the question haunting many policy analysts. In this context, one needs to look into three broad ‘areas. Foremost among them is the border question. This issue has two dimensions. First, some-boundary specialists would argue that at the end of 1994, there were more than 100 disputed boundaries around the world. This is a vexed problem of the international community and there are no fixed ground rules for this. And these experts feel that after the 1958-59 India-China boundary talks, it became clear that this issue has no academic solution.
Second, India is not in a position to cede any territory to others except for a few kilometers this way or that. Therefore, to resolve the vexed boundary issue and establish cordial relations with India, China has to vacate the occupied territory.
In addition, both Jiang Zemin and Atal Behari Vajpayee are new to the centre of power in their respective countries.
Neither of them are charismatic personalities like Pandit Jawaharfal Nehru, Mrs. Indira Gandhi , Chairman Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. They have limited political clout in their respective countries. Therefore, to expect the governments of these two leaders to find a solution to the decades-old India-China boundary question is just not possible. Hence, status quo will continue and this may remain as one of the unresolved boundary questions, which will be carried into the 21st century.
Second is the economic cooperation between the two countries. Both China and India are developing countries, and each side enjoys some advantage over the other in trade. Incidentally, both are exporters of primary commodities and semi-manufactured goods. At the moment, in the international market, India enjoys a marginal advantage over China, because of its being a member of the World Trade Organisation.
Otherwise, both the economies are competing with each other in the international market. Therefore, the scope for a larger volume of India-China trade is rather slim. The existing volume of India-China trade at around $1 billion may at best grow into $4.5 billion by the turn of the century In percentage terms of foreign trade of India and China, this is less than one per cent of each country’s trade. I am not arguing against increasing trade between China and India. But as I mentioned earlier, the ground realities are different. Any expectation of faster growth of India-China trade is nothing but wishful thinking.
India-China joint ventures in third countries is once again a low feasibility proposition because of the reasons mentioned above.
Therefore, we can assume that in the immediate future, say in the next ten years, both sides should reconcile to the fact that the existing level of economic cooperation cannot be improved dramatically, and efforts to improve upon it may result in some changes, but marginally only. In fact, here one should also note that China is mixing politics with economics to a certain extent. For example, China would prefer the US to India in awarding a contract.
Lastly, the option to improve people-to-people level contacts between India and China. This, undoubtedly, is one area where more interaction can take place between the two countries. But, the spirit of Hindi-Chini Bhai Thai of the 1950s cannot stage a comeback for obvious reasons.
To conclude, for their own strategic interests, both China and India broke the impasse that had set into their relations from 1962 onwards, in the early l980s, and continued to do so even in the 1990s. The political leadership of both these nations have, over the last 15 years, evolved a mature relationship which is mutually beneficial. To take it beyond this level in the immediate future does not seem possible at this point of time. However, both nations would continue the existing level of relationship in future also in their own interest.
Saturday, September 26, 2009
India has a moral commitment on Tibet
India has a moral commitment on Tibet
The govt has to be firm with China
Not Freeze; But Actively Discuss Border
By Ram Madhav
In 1980 when Deng Xiaoping suggested sector-wise approach to resolving the border conflict between India and China it was presumed that he was only resuming Zhou’s line. However when the border talks began in 1981 Indian side got clear indications that the Chinese are pursuing a maximalist approach. By 1985 when the 6th round of talks began the Chinese had started making open claims over Tawang in particular and Arunachal Pradesh in general.
For the Chinese, the obvious policy appears to be to get the maximum territorial advantage of the talks. That is the reason behind their constant harping on Arunachal Pradesh. Even there the initial claims were only over the Tawang region.
Till the 60s the Chinese were talking about a bilateral settlement on Aksai Chin. The 38,000 sq. km. area part of Ladakh region came under illegal occupation of the Chinese Red Army, which started constructing the Karakoram Highway linking Tibet with Sinkiang region in the 50s.
Zhou Enlai, the then Premier of China, convinced Jawaharlal Nehru that the McMahon Line is an ‘imperial leftover’ and hence China and India should reject it. Under Krishna Menon Plan in 1960 it was even proposed that India should agree for the Chinese control over Aksai Chin while the Chinese on their part would agree for something ‘closer’ to McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh.
This, obviously, was not acceptable to India because China was conspiring to annex Indian territory in exchange for another Indian territory. The proposal failed; war followed; and we formally lost control over the Aksai Chin region.
Subsequently Sikkim became the theatre of conflict. While India was engaged in a war with Pakistan in 1965 the Chinese PLA was actively making incursions into the Indian territory in Sikkim along the Tibetan border. China blamed India for preventing its sheep from grazing inside the Indian territory, which led to the incursions. There were skirmishes between September and December in 1965 in that region.
Tensions continued along the Sikkim-Tibet border where there was armed conflict in September 1967 near Nathu La Pass when the PLA tried to cross the border in large numbers. Indian troops had successfully repulsed these advances.
By the 80s, the theatre shifted to the eastern sector and Arunachal Pradesh became the new arena of conflict. While under the so-called Krishna Menon Plan the Chinese were willing to agree for the Indian claims in the eastern region in exchange for Aksai Chin, in 80s they started making fresh claims over Arunachal Pradesh.
In 1980 when Deng Xiaoping suggested sector-wise approach to resolving the border conflict between India and China it was presumed that he was only resuming Zhou’s line. However, when the border talks began in 1981 Indian side got clear indications that the Chinese are pursuing a maximalist approach. By 1985 when the 6th round of talks began the Chinese had started making open claims over Tawang in particular and Arunachal Pradesh in general.
What followed gives a clear idea of the Chinese method. There were major border violations by China in 1987 in the Sumdorong Chu Valley where the Chinese had penetrated deep into the Indian territory and constructed a helipad and started bringing in reconnaissance. This had led to a major military build-up and an eyeball-to-eyeball positioning of both the troops.
Tensions ran very high for several years until the Narasimha Rao regime signed a treaty with the Chinese Government in 1993. In a way this treaty too could be called a victory for the Chinese side, as it had resulted in both Indian and Chinese troops moving out of the Sumdorong Chu Valley and leaving it a neutral region. Once again while the Chinese had to vacate the territory that they occupied the Indians were forced to vacate what belonged to them.
Almost five decades of efforts to resolve the border issues had resulted only in India conceding every time and ending up as the loser. Zhou talked of a ‘package deal’; Deng talked of sector-wise approach. We today see neither of them to be relevant anymore. Of the 2500-km border only peaceful sector is the middle one-namely the Tibet-Uttarakhand/Himachal border, which is not more than about 550 km.
The Chinese refuse to talk anymore about the Aksai Chin. For them it is a settled fact. What is unfortunate is that even our own leadership stopped talking about it. Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988; Narasimha Rao in 1993 and Vajpayee in 2003. The nation has not heard them talk about the occupation despite the fact that there is a unanimous Parliament resolution of 1962 on getting that territory back.
For the Chinese, the obvious policy appears to be to get the maximum territorial advantage of the talks. That is the reason behind their constant harping on Arunachal Pradesh. Even there the initial claims were only over the Tawang region. These claims were based on the so-called historical aspects like the birth of the 6th Dalai Lama Tsangyang Gyatso there.
But now the claims extend to the entire state of Arunachal. In 2006, just a couple of weeks ahead of the visit of the Chinese President Hu Jintao to India, the Chinese Ambassador to Delhi Sun Yuxi had made the outrageous claim that Arunachal Pradesh belonged to China. "In our position the whole of what you call the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory, and Tawang (district) is only one place in it. We are claiming all of that-that’s our position," he told the news channel CNN-IBN. India forced China to call him back. But the events after his return make it amply clear that the Chinese have their eyes firmly set on that state.
For China the McMahon Line is only an excuse. This so-called ‘imperialist line’ is the one that demarcates the border between Myanmar and China. It is thus clear that it either intends to occupy more Indian territory or use it as a bargaining chip for something else. The big question is: What could that something else be?
One of the most contentious issues between India and China has been the presence of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his people on the Indian soil. Although successive Indian Governments, starting with Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954, have conceded directly or indirectly that Tibet is a part of China, the Chinese harbour serious apprehensions. They see in HH the Dalai Lama not a venerable saintly figure but a ‘divisive politician’. They are convinced that it was His Holiness and the agents of the West that were responsible for the recent uprising in Tibet and apprehend more trouble in future.
India on its part tries to mollycoddle China by assuring it that its soil wouldn’t be allowed to be used for any anti-China activities. Yet the suspicions remain. They knew about the tremendous popularity HH the Dalai Lama enjoys in Tibet even to this day despite his exile for almost half-a-century. In the 80s, when his representatives were allowed by the Chinese authorities to visit Tibet, they received unprecedented and spontaneous welcome. That must have rattled the Chinese leadership.
The Chinese attitude towards the Dalai Lama and his people hardened quite a bit after that, which continues to this day. No effort is spared by China to browbeat countries that extend an invitation to HH the Dalai Lama. Very recently it pressurised Sri Lanka into withdrawing its invitation to him. All this in spite of the fact that countries like India categorically declared that Tibet is an internal matter of China.
This brings us to the most crucial aspect of India-China relations-i.e. the Tibetan exiles including the Dalai Lama, not Tibet. This shift from Tibet to the Tibetans is very important today.
For India the critical issue is its sovereignty. The Government has to be firm on that question. The policy of freezing border question and addressing all other issues like bilateral trade and cultural exchanges etc no longer works. It has to sit down and seriously work on the demarcation of the border by exchanging maps. While doing that we must act as equals, not as subordinates or inferiors.
What plagues Indian establishment is the utter lack of unanimity in the ruling establishment. Reports suggest serious differences between the PMO and the MEA on one side and the Defence Ministry and the Home Ministry on the other.
India has a moral and ethical commitment to HH the Dalai Lama and his people. Every Indian wants them to realise their dream of a return to their homeland but with dignity and honour. India is duty-bound to help in that process. Unfortunately our Government has completely abdicated that duty. It is only the American official visitors who raise the question of Tibet with their Chinese counterparts; we seldom do that.
Just to reiterate: It is no longer the question of Tibet; it is the question of the Tibetans now.
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The Moving Finger Writes
China: An enemy at large
By M.V. Kamath
China is no friend of India. According to China expert Gordon Chang, author of The Coming Collapse of China, "China sees India as an adversary and wants to destabilise it". According to him, "China has supported terrorists who operate in India and China transferred nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan to keep India in check." The closer Pakistan is at the breaking point, the more China will try to encircle India by making friendly overtures towards India’s neighbours.
Does anyone remember the time when India was forced to take action against Pakistan forces in East Bengal as millions of refugees began to pour into West Bengal following the revolt of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman against Islamabad’s military misrule? Forced to take military action, India stormed into East Bengal and defeated the Pakistani Army and took 90,000 Pakistani soldiers as prisoners-of-war. It was at that time that one of India’s worst enemies, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, tried to persuade China to attack India.
The same story at a different level is being enacted now. Pakistan itself is in deep trouble. It is scared that India may take advantage of its current situation and amass its troops along the Indo-Pak border. Pakistan, under pressure from the US has withdrawn a sizeable segment of its forces from the East for action against the Taliban in the West. Pakistan is afraid that India might take this opportunity and invade it. In the circumstances, the Pakistan Armed Forces must have persuaded Beijing to indulge in illegal activities along the Sino-Indian border to distract the Government of India.
According to the Indian Army chief, there were 21 Chinese incursions in June, 20 in July and 24 in August. Between 2006 and 2008 Chinese intrusions doubled from 140 incidents to 270. These are obvious tactics, but they should be taken seriously. For Shri SM Krishna, External Affairs Minister, to play down the aggressive tactics employed by China in the Ladakh region by saying that the Sino-Indian border is "most peaceful" fools no one. Shri Krishna may be playing the diplomatic game but either he is unwilling to read up on history or is ignorant of how China betrayed India even as Nehru and VK Krishna Menon were espousing Hindi Chini bhai bhai.
China is no friend of India. According to China expert Gordon Chang, author of The Coming Collapse of China, "China sees India as an adversary and wants to destabilise it." According to him, "China has supported terrorists who operate in India and China transferred nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan to keep India in check." The closer Pakistan is at the breaking point, the more China will try to encircle India by making friendly overtures towards India’s neighbours, Mynmar, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. The United States can do nothing. Either it doesn’t want to or is incapable of taking China on-a nation to which it is deeply indebted. It is shocking to think that it is beholden to Pakistan for containing the Taliban.
To see the United States, the only Super Power on earth grovelling at the feet of Pakistan and promising it $7.5 billion in aid over five years, most of which goes into the pockets of the Pakistan Army, is unbelievable. An official US agency had charged Pakistan with misusing American aid to fight the Taliban by spending the money to buy arms to fight India. And now, to top it all former President Pervez Musharraf has himself admitted that Pakistan has been freely using US aid to strengthen its defences against India. In an interview he even went so far as to say that he did not care whether the US would be angered by his disclosure. Pakistan gets its arms practically free. India has to spend billions to match Pakistan’s offensive capabilities. The US is thus enforcing an arms race in South Asia to India’s detriment.
With the United States as ‘friend’, India does not need enemies. China is trying to keep India in perpetual fear of war and has had the impertinence to warn the Dalai Lama not to visit Arunachal Pradesh and especially Tawang. It is here that Dalai Lama halted in 1959 when he escaped from Lhasa. He has close links with a monastery there and he has every right to visit it. China’s remarks must be treated with total disdain. If once India gives in, China will misunderstand it as weakness and seek to make more demands.
Already there is a general feeling that India is weak-minded and can be easily threatened to submission. Delhi should not give the wrong signals. At the same time, Pakistan’s provocative act of firing rockets across the Wagah border calls for instant reaction. This also is a deliberate attempt to see how far Pakistan can go before Delhi reacts. The suggestion must have come from China. One sees more than a similarity between Chinese incursions in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh and Pakistani infiltration into Indian territory. The United States can be of no help either way. It has been consistently unreliable in the last four decades. The disgraced Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan has revealed that Pakistan was ready to test a nuclear bomb as early as 1984 as the US was inclined to overlook its clandestine atomic programme in the initial years, due to Islamabad’s involvement in the US-led war against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.
The US even looked the other way when Pakistan bought 200 anti-aircraft missiles from North Korea during the Kargil War and the dollars came from US aid. Even when North Korean engineers came to visit the Kahuta nuclear plant in Pakistan quite openly, the US had nothing to say. A Q Khan got away, as they say, with murder. He could do anything illegal like supplying equipments to Iran or Libya and no questions were asked. The current Pakistani attacks have not brought out one single protest or warning from Washington. Obviously, as Gordon Chang says, everybody is aware of America’s current problems which prevents Washington from taking a strong stand.
Apart from ‘invading’ Indian territory, China is becoming a host to terrorists. What arms, for instance, was a China-bound UAE Air force plane carrying when it made an emergency landing in India? At first the pilot lied about the cargo. When its real nature was discovered, there were red faces. For whom were those arms meant for? Certainly not for China? They are obviously intended for terrorists who have been given shelter in China and who make occasional forays in North East India. Shri Krishna may not want to show his hand but if he really believes that the recent incidents are not a cause for concern, India is going to be in real trouble soon. The time is ripe to tell both Pakistan and China that there is a limit to India’s forbearance and they had better beware. Barbarians do not understand politeness. They understand power and the willingness to use it. Shri SM Krishna must think again. India has paid dearly for pussyfooting in the past. It would be foolish to repeat the performance all over again.
The govt has to be firm with China
Not Freeze; But Actively Discuss Border
By Ram Madhav
In 1980 when Deng Xiaoping suggested sector-wise approach to resolving the border conflict between India and China it was presumed that he was only resuming Zhou’s line. However when the border talks began in 1981 Indian side got clear indications that the Chinese are pursuing a maximalist approach. By 1985 when the 6th round of talks began the Chinese had started making open claims over Tawang in particular and Arunachal Pradesh in general.
For the Chinese, the obvious policy appears to be to get the maximum territorial advantage of the talks. That is the reason behind their constant harping on Arunachal Pradesh. Even there the initial claims were only over the Tawang region.
Till the 60s the Chinese were talking about a bilateral settlement on Aksai Chin. The 38,000 sq. km. area part of Ladakh region came under illegal occupation of the Chinese Red Army, which started constructing the Karakoram Highway linking Tibet with Sinkiang region in the 50s.
Zhou Enlai, the then Premier of China, convinced Jawaharlal Nehru that the McMahon Line is an ‘imperial leftover’ and hence China and India should reject it. Under Krishna Menon Plan in 1960 it was even proposed that India should agree for the Chinese control over Aksai Chin while the Chinese on their part would agree for something ‘closer’ to McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh.
This, obviously, was not acceptable to India because China was conspiring to annex Indian territory in exchange for another Indian territory. The proposal failed; war followed; and we formally lost control over the Aksai Chin region.
Subsequently Sikkim became the theatre of conflict. While India was engaged in a war with Pakistan in 1965 the Chinese PLA was actively making incursions into the Indian territory in Sikkim along the Tibetan border. China blamed India for preventing its sheep from grazing inside the Indian territory, which led to the incursions. There were skirmishes between September and December in 1965 in that region.
Tensions continued along the Sikkim-Tibet border where there was armed conflict in September 1967 near Nathu La Pass when the PLA tried to cross the border in large numbers. Indian troops had successfully repulsed these advances.
By the 80s, the theatre shifted to the eastern sector and Arunachal Pradesh became the new arena of conflict. While under the so-called Krishna Menon Plan the Chinese were willing to agree for the Indian claims in the eastern region in exchange for Aksai Chin, in 80s they started making fresh claims over Arunachal Pradesh.
In 1980 when Deng Xiaoping suggested sector-wise approach to resolving the border conflict between India and China it was presumed that he was only resuming Zhou’s line. However, when the border talks began in 1981 Indian side got clear indications that the Chinese are pursuing a maximalist approach. By 1985 when the 6th round of talks began the Chinese had started making open claims over Tawang in particular and Arunachal Pradesh in general.
What followed gives a clear idea of the Chinese method. There were major border violations by China in 1987 in the Sumdorong Chu Valley where the Chinese had penetrated deep into the Indian territory and constructed a helipad and started bringing in reconnaissance. This had led to a major military build-up and an eyeball-to-eyeball positioning of both the troops.
Tensions ran very high for several years until the Narasimha Rao regime signed a treaty with the Chinese Government in 1993. In a way this treaty too could be called a victory for the Chinese side, as it had resulted in both Indian and Chinese troops moving out of the Sumdorong Chu Valley and leaving it a neutral region. Once again while the Chinese had to vacate the territory that they occupied the Indians were forced to vacate what belonged to them.
Almost five decades of efforts to resolve the border issues had resulted only in India conceding every time and ending up as the loser. Zhou talked of a ‘package deal’; Deng talked of sector-wise approach. We today see neither of them to be relevant anymore. Of the 2500-km border only peaceful sector is the middle one-namely the Tibet-Uttarakhand/Himachal border, which is not more than about 550 km.
The Chinese refuse to talk anymore about the Aksai Chin. For them it is a settled fact. What is unfortunate is that even our own leadership stopped talking about it. Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988; Narasimha Rao in 1993 and Vajpayee in 2003. The nation has not heard them talk about the occupation despite the fact that there is a unanimous Parliament resolution of 1962 on getting that territory back.
For the Chinese, the obvious policy appears to be to get the maximum territorial advantage of the talks. That is the reason behind their constant harping on Arunachal Pradesh. Even there the initial claims were only over the Tawang region. These claims were based on the so-called historical aspects like the birth of the 6th Dalai Lama Tsangyang Gyatso there.
But now the claims extend to the entire state of Arunachal. In 2006, just a couple of weeks ahead of the visit of the Chinese President Hu Jintao to India, the Chinese Ambassador to Delhi Sun Yuxi had made the outrageous claim that Arunachal Pradesh belonged to China. "In our position the whole of what you call the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory, and Tawang (district) is only one place in it. We are claiming all of that-that’s our position," he told the news channel CNN-IBN. India forced China to call him back. But the events after his return make it amply clear that the Chinese have their eyes firmly set on that state.
For China the McMahon Line is only an excuse. This so-called ‘imperialist line’ is the one that demarcates the border between Myanmar and China. It is thus clear that it either intends to occupy more Indian territory or use it as a bargaining chip for something else. The big question is: What could that something else be?
One of the most contentious issues between India and China has been the presence of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his people on the Indian soil. Although successive Indian Governments, starting with Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954, have conceded directly or indirectly that Tibet is a part of China, the Chinese harbour serious apprehensions. They see in HH the Dalai Lama not a venerable saintly figure but a ‘divisive politician’. They are convinced that it was His Holiness and the agents of the West that were responsible for the recent uprising in Tibet and apprehend more trouble in future.
India on its part tries to mollycoddle China by assuring it that its soil wouldn’t be allowed to be used for any anti-China activities. Yet the suspicions remain. They knew about the tremendous popularity HH the Dalai Lama enjoys in Tibet even to this day despite his exile for almost half-a-century. In the 80s, when his representatives were allowed by the Chinese authorities to visit Tibet, they received unprecedented and spontaneous welcome. That must have rattled the Chinese leadership.
The Chinese attitude towards the Dalai Lama and his people hardened quite a bit after that, which continues to this day. No effort is spared by China to browbeat countries that extend an invitation to HH the Dalai Lama. Very recently it pressurised Sri Lanka into withdrawing its invitation to him. All this in spite of the fact that countries like India categorically declared that Tibet is an internal matter of China.
This brings us to the most crucial aspect of India-China relations-i.e. the Tibetan exiles including the Dalai Lama, not Tibet. This shift from Tibet to the Tibetans is very important today.
For India the critical issue is its sovereignty. The Government has to be firm on that question. The policy of freezing border question and addressing all other issues like bilateral trade and cultural exchanges etc no longer works. It has to sit down and seriously work on the demarcation of the border by exchanging maps. While doing that we must act as equals, not as subordinates or inferiors.
What plagues Indian establishment is the utter lack of unanimity in the ruling establishment. Reports suggest serious differences between the PMO and the MEA on one side and the Defence Ministry and the Home Ministry on the other.
India has a moral and ethical commitment to HH the Dalai Lama and his people. Every Indian wants them to realise their dream of a return to their homeland but with dignity and honour. India is duty-bound to help in that process. Unfortunately our Government has completely abdicated that duty. It is only the American official visitors who raise the question of Tibet with their Chinese counterparts; we seldom do that.
Just to reiterate: It is no longer the question of Tibet; it is the question of the Tibetans now.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Moving Finger Writes
China: An enemy at large
By M.V. Kamath
China is no friend of India. According to China expert Gordon Chang, author of The Coming Collapse of China, "China sees India as an adversary and wants to destabilise it". According to him, "China has supported terrorists who operate in India and China transferred nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan to keep India in check." The closer Pakistan is at the breaking point, the more China will try to encircle India by making friendly overtures towards India’s neighbours.
Does anyone remember the time when India was forced to take action against Pakistan forces in East Bengal as millions of refugees began to pour into West Bengal following the revolt of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman against Islamabad’s military misrule? Forced to take military action, India stormed into East Bengal and defeated the Pakistani Army and took 90,000 Pakistani soldiers as prisoners-of-war. It was at that time that one of India’s worst enemies, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, tried to persuade China to attack India.
The same story at a different level is being enacted now. Pakistan itself is in deep trouble. It is scared that India may take advantage of its current situation and amass its troops along the Indo-Pak border. Pakistan, under pressure from the US has withdrawn a sizeable segment of its forces from the East for action against the Taliban in the West. Pakistan is afraid that India might take this opportunity and invade it. In the circumstances, the Pakistan Armed Forces must have persuaded Beijing to indulge in illegal activities along the Sino-Indian border to distract the Government of India.
According to the Indian Army chief, there were 21 Chinese incursions in June, 20 in July and 24 in August. Between 2006 and 2008 Chinese intrusions doubled from 140 incidents to 270. These are obvious tactics, but they should be taken seriously. For Shri SM Krishna, External Affairs Minister, to play down the aggressive tactics employed by China in the Ladakh region by saying that the Sino-Indian border is "most peaceful" fools no one. Shri Krishna may be playing the diplomatic game but either he is unwilling to read up on history or is ignorant of how China betrayed India even as Nehru and VK Krishna Menon were espousing Hindi Chini bhai bhai.
China is no friend of India. According to China expert Gordon Chang, author of The Coming Collapse of China, "China sees India as an adversary and wants to destabilise it." According to him, "China has supported terrorists who operate in India and China transferred nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan to keep India in check." The closer Pakistan is at the breaking point, the more China will try to encircle India by making friendly overtures towards India’s neighbours, Mynmar, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. The United States can do nothing. Either it doesn’t want to or is incapable of taking China on-a nation to which it is deeply indebted. It is shocking to think that it is beholden to Pakistan for containing the Taliban.
To see the United States, the only Super Power on earth grovelling at the feet of Pakistan and promising it $7.5 billion in aid over five years, most of which goes into the pockets of the Pakistan Army, is unbelievable. An official US agency had charged Pakistan with misusing American aid to fight the Taliban by spending the money to buy arms to fight India. And now, to top it all former President Pervez Musharraf has himself admitted that Pakistan has been freely using US aid to strengthen its defences against India. In an interview he even went so far as to say that he did not care whether the US would be angered by his disclosure. Pakistan gets its arms practically free. India has to spend billions to match Pakistan’s offensive capabilities. The US is thus enforcing an arms race in South Asia to India’s detriment.
With the United States as ‘friend’, India does not need enemies. China is trying to keep India in perpetual fear of war and has had the impertinence to warn the Dalai Lama not to visit Arunachal Pradesh and especially Tawang. It is here that Dalai Lama halted in 1959 when he escaped from Lhasa. He has close links with a monastery there and he has every right to visit it. China’s remarks must be treated with total disdain. If once India gives in, China will misunderstand it as weakness and seek to make more demands.
Already there is a general feeling that India is weak-minded and can be easily threatened to submission. Delhi should not give the wrong signals. At the same time, Pakistan’s provocative act of firing rockets across the Wagah border calls for instant reaction. This also is a deliberate attempt to see how far Pakistan can go before Delhi reacts. The suggestion must have come from China. One sees more than a similarity between Chinese incursions in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh and Pakistani infiltration into Indian territory. The United States can be of no help either way. It has been consistently unreliable in the last four decades. The disgraced Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan has revealed that Pakistan was ready to test a nuclear bomb as early as 1984 as the US was inclined to overlook its clandestine atomic programme in the initial years, due to Islamabad’s involvement in the US-led war against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.
The US even looked the other way when Pakistan bought 200 anti-aircraft missiles from North Korea during the Kargil War and the dollars came from US aid. Even when North Korean engineers came to visit the Kahuta nuclear plant in Pakistan quite openly, the US had nothing to say. A Q Khan got away, as they say, with murder. He could do anything illegal like supplying equipments to Iran or Libya and no questions were asked. The current Pakistani attacks have not brought out one single protest or warning from Washington. Obviously, as Gordon Chang says, everybody is aware of America’s current problems which prevents Washington from taking a strong stand.
Apart from ‘invading’ Indian territory, China is becoming a host to terrorists. What arms, for instance, was a China-bound UAE Air force plane carrying when it made an emergency landing in India? At first the pilot lied about the cargo. When its real nature was discovered, there were red faces. For whom were those arms meant for? Certainly not for China? They are obviously intended for terrorists who have been given shelter in China and who make occasional forays in North East India. Shri Krishna may not want to show his hand but if he really believes that the recent incidents are not a cause for concern, India is going to be in real trouble soon. The time is ripe to tell both Pakistan and China that there is a limit to India’s forbearance and they had better beware. Barbarians do not understand politeness. They understand power and the willingness to use it. Shri SM Krishna must think again. India has paid dearly for pussyfooting in the past. It would be foolish to repeat the performance all over again.
Mainstream, Vol. XLVII, No 41, September 26, 2009
Chinese Soldiers on Indian Borders
Saturday 26 September 2009, by Harish Chandola
The media these days are full of stories of the Chinese Army’s violation of India’s northern borders. Of late it spoke of violation in the central sector. I live in a border town in this sector. Before one believes these stories of violations, one should have an idea of the border topography. The border, not surveyed and not demarcated yet, for it to be accepted by both sides, runs along the highest ridges, across which it is impossible to see. A newspaper story quoted a villager seeing Chinese roads built in Tibet and Chinese soldiers coming on them. That is impossibility. One can see Tibet only from the top of the ridge that, in this sector, divides India from Tibet. Seeing Chinese motor roads from the Indian side is a matter of imagination and so is seeing soldiers coming riding across.
Does India have sentries bang on the border ridges? It does not. I speak of the central sector, reported to have been violated. This sector, as the entire border now, is patrolled by the Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP), created to guard the border. The disputed area here is called Bara Hoti, an 80-square kilometre sloping pasture. The ITBP post in this sector is at Rim Khim, some ten kilometres from the high pass one has to cross to enter Tibet. Two kilometres ahead of the ITBP post is a ridge where there is an observation post where the ITBP men and an Indian Army soldier go and spend the day watching the border. Beyond that is a lake called Parvati Kund and then a small river called the Hoti Gad, from where one starts climbing to the high passes of Tunjunla, Marila and Salsalla that lead into Tibet. From the Indian observation post the passes are at least eight kilometres away, from where it will be impossible to notice anyone coming through the passes.
The ITBP men do go patrolling into the pasture and up to the lake. The pasture has Indian shepherds from the border villages tending their sheep. The ITBP men have in the past come across people from Tibet bringing their yaks for grazing to the pasture. They wear standard Chinese close collar jackets and trousers and are sometimes taken for Chinese soldiers. Neither side knows the language of the other. Yak owners do gesticulate which has been interpreted by the ITBP men as saying that the pasture belongs to them. From the Indian border villages shepherds stay in the pastures for months. The high altitude grass there is very nourishing and fattens the winter-starved sheep and yak.
In the 1962 border war there was no fighting in this sector, while battles were fought in the eastern and western sectors. Chinese soldiers did come to this sector, as did Indian ones and there was some argument but no shots were fired. Since then there has never been any shooting or conflict in the area.
Those that bring their yaks across are surely Tibetan villagers and not Chinese soldiers. Soldiers always carry guns and generally ride horses. The Chinese motor road does come to the Tibetan border village of Dapa and a little below the passes, which are quite high, at about 17,000 feet. It is said that perhaps once a year, in July or August, Chinese soldiers do come across Tunjunla and down to the Hoti Gad river. There have been occasions when the ITBP men have gone there to confront them and show banners written in Chinese saying it is Indian territory and they should go back. And they have always gone back. Coming there once a year might be a way to their asserting that they have a claim to it and the border remains disputed. In the other tiny disputed area in this sector, beyond Neelang and Jadang, the Chinese have not come at all.
As stated, nobody lives in the bowl-like pasture all the year round. Indian shepherds arrive there in the summer. Occasionally an ITBP patrol with a lone Indian Armyman goes there.
¨
One wondered how and who leaked to the media the news of Chinese troop incursion in the middle sector. There are only three sources: the Army, the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing. Officials of the last two stay in Joshimath, almost a hundred kilometres from the border. They seldom go to the border and it may not be easy for them to get day-to-day information from there. The ITBP and the Army have persons on that border and know more than the others the goings-on there. One does not know if it is the intention of the Army to create an impression that China is causing a threat along the middle sector and in fact all along the border.
The last round of India-China talks on the border was held in Delhi last month. Neither side gave any account of what happened at that round. China has issued a long report which does not go beyond generalities of both sides wanting to settle the issue peacefully through negotiations. At what stage the talks are, neither side has made public. The last one heard years ago was that both sides had asked for their respective maps. India had given its border maps to China, but China has made no comment of them so far. What are they doing with the maps? Are they trying to reconcile them? There has been no news.
I have visited some passes in the eastern sector, like Jalepla, Nathula in Sikkim and the one below Chhuthangmo in Kameng of Arunachal Pradesh. From nowhere on the Indian side can one see Tibet across these passes and this must be the case with passes that lie further to the east. Yet there has been a spate of news stories of Chinese soldiers being seen intruding in the west, central and eastern sectors of our border and the media has gone to town over the security threat China is said to be causing all around, not only along the border but also from next-door countries like Myanmar, where China is said to be planning to build a naval station.
Apart from protesting over the visit of the Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh, the Chinese have made no statements that could be remotely related to its unhappiness over the border deliberations or developments in India.
Chinese Soldiers on Indian Borders
Saturday 26 September 2009, by Harish Chandola
The media these days are full of stories of the Chinese Army’s violation of India’s northern borders. Of late it spoke of violation in the central sector. I live in a border town in this sector. Before one believes these stories of violations, one should have an idea of the border topography. The border, not surveyed and not demarcated yet, for it to be accepted by both sides, runs along the highest ridges, across which it is impossible to see. A newspaper story quoted a villager seeing Chinese roads built in Tibet and Chinese soldiers coming on them. That is impossibility. One can see Tibet only from the top of the ridge that, in this sector, divides India from Tibet. Seeing Chinese motor roads from the Indian side is a matter of imagination and so is seeing soldiers coming riding across.
Does India have sentries bang on the border ridges? It does not. I speak of the central sector, reported to have been violated. This sector, as the entire border now, is patrolled by the Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP), created to guard the border. The disputed area here is called Bara Hoti, an 80-square kilometre sloping pasture. The ITBP post in this sector is at Rim Khim, some ten kilometres from the high pass one has to cross to enter Tibet. Two kilometres ahead of the ITBP post is a ridge where there is an observation post where the ITBP men and an Indian Army soldier go and spend the day watching the border. Beyond that is a lake called Parvati Kund and then a small river called the Hoti Gad, from where one starts climbing to the high passes of Tunjunla, Marila and Salsalla that lead into Tibet. From the Indian observation post the passes are at least eight kilometres away, from where it will be impossible to notice anyone coming through the passes.
The ITBP men do go patrolling into the pasture and up to the lake. The pasture has Indian shepherds from the border villages tending their sheep. The ITBP men have in the past come across people from Tibet bringing their yaks for grazing to the pasture. They wear standard Chinese close collar jackets and trousers and are sometimes taken for Chinese soldiers. Neither side knows the language of the other. Yak owners do gesticulate which has been interpreted by the ITBP men as saying that the pasture belongs to them. From the Indian border villages shepherds stay in the pastures for months. The high altitude grass there is very nourishing and fattens the winter-starved sheep and yak.
In the 1962 border war there was no fighting in this sector, while battles were fought in the eastern and western sectors. Chinese soldiers did come to this sector, as did Indian ones and there was some argument but no shots were fired. Since then there has never been any shooting or conflict in the area.
Those that bring their yaks across are surely Tibetan villagers and not Chinese soldiers. Soldiers always carry guns and generally ride horses. The Chinese motor road does come to the Tibetan border village of Dapa and a little below the passes, which are quite high, at about 17,000 feet. It is said that perhaps once a year, in July or August, Chinese soldiers do come across Tunjunla and down to the Hoti Gad river. There have been occasions when the ITBP men have gone there to confront them and show banners written in Chinese saying it is Indian territory and they should go back. And they have always gone back. Coming there once a year might be a way to their asserting that they have a claim to it and the border remains disputed. In the other tiny disputed area in this sector, beyond Neelang and Jadang, the Chinese have not come at all.
As stated, nobody lives in the bowl-like pasture all the year round. Indian shepherds arrive there in the summer. Occasionally an ITBP patrol with a lone Indian Armyman goes there.
¨
One wondered how and who leaked to the media the news of Chinese troop incursion in the middle sector. There are only three sources: the Army, the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing. Officials of the last two stay in Joshimath, almost a hundred kilometres from the border. They seldom go to the border and it may not be easy for them to get day-to-day information from there. The ITBP and the Army have persons on that border and know more than the others the goings-on there. One does not know if it is the intention of the Army to create an impression that China is causing a threat along the middle sector and in fact all along the border.
The last round of India-China talks on the border was held in Delhi last month. Neither side gave any account of what happened at that round. China has issued a long report which does not go beyond generalities of both sides wanting to settle the issue peacefully through negotiations. At what stage the talks are, neither side has made public. The last one heard years ago was that both sides had asked for their respective maps. India had given its border maps to China, but China has made no comment of them so far. What are they doing with the maps? Are they trying to reconcile them? There has been no news.
I have visited some passes in the eastern sector, like Jalepla, Nathula in Sikkim and the one below Chhuthangmo in Kameng of Arunachal Pradesh. From nowhere on the Indian side can one see Tibet across these passes and this must be the case with passes that lie further to the east. Yet there has been a spate of news stories of Chinese soldiers being seen intruding in the west, central and eastern sectors of our border and the media has gone to town over the security threat China is said to be causing all around, not only along the border but also from next-door countries like Myanmar, where China is said to be planning to build a naval station.
Apart from protesting over the visit of the Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh, the Chinese have made no statements that could be remotely related to its unhappiness over the border deliberations or developments in India.
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
Nathu La- Bridging the Himalayas
By Satyajit Mohanty
Indian Revenue Service
A significant decision of the 2006 Sino-Indian
Friendship Year was to reopen the Nathu La
(pass) for trade. Nathu La was closed following
the 1962 Sino-Indian war and its reopening had
both symbolic and economic significance for
India and China. Interestingly, the “Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of
India and the Government of the People’s
Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse
between Tibet Region of China and India.” in
1954 specifically recognized the need to establish
additional trading points and facilitate an open
border where pilgrims and local inhabitants could
move across the border without legal hassles.
Popularly known as the Panchsheel Agreement, it
forms the foundation of Sino-Indian Confidence
and Security Building Measures (CSBMs).
I
BILATERAL RELATIONS
SIGNIFICANCE OF TRADE
Before analyzing the impact of the reopening of
the 14,140 feet Nathu La on Sino-Indian bilateral
relations, it would be pertinent to seek some sort
of answer to a seemingly simple question – does
increased trade between nations dampen or
exacerbate conflict? This question has generated
a variegated response cutting across a broad
spectrum of theoretical literature. Realism argues
that state capabilities, measured primarily in
terms of military power, determine state
behaviour. Cooperation in the international
system is not possible as relative rather than
absolute gains that states derive from such
cooperation affects the balance of power.
By contrast, the liberal tradition gives importance
to state preferences, rather than state
capabilities. Free trade ushers in economic
prosperity and interdependence and the result is a
rise in the costs of war which rational states avoid.
Taking off from these debates, Dale Copeland
argued that expectations of future trade and
resultant gains would encourage dependent states
to assign a high value to continuation of peaceful
trade, making war a less appealing option.
Suffice it to say, indexed in Purchasing Power Parity
terms, China and India are projected to be the top
two economies of the world by 2050. Sino-Indian
bilateral trade has become increasingly
complementary increasing from a paltry US$339
million in 1992 to US$25,734 in 2007-08. As per the
report of India-China Joint Study Group on
Comprehensive Trade and Economic Cooperation,
the average annual growth rate of trade at 26.4
per cent during 1995-2003, had been higher than
the average growth rate of trade for either China or
India during the same period.
China overtook the US as India’s largest trading
partner in 2007-08. When compared to 2005-06,
bilateral trade grew by 46 per cent in 2006-07.
Given the buoyancy in Sino-Indian trade, the target
of US$40 billion trade by 2010 was revised upwards
to US$60 billion during the visit of Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh to Beijing in January 2008.
Opening of the Nathu La and other land routes for
cross-border trade in future would help achieve this
goal.
II
NATHU LA
BREAKING THE BARRIER
Nathu La formed a part of the ancient silk route
and formal trade linkages between British India and
Tibet through the mountainous passes date back to
the late 18th century. Early in the 19th century, the
Satyajit Mohanty
Indian Revenue Service
IPCS ISSUE BRIEF
British annexed large tracts of the territories of
Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal and trade through the
various passes increased further. Trade in this
region accounted for 80 per cent of total border
trade volume between India and China in the
early 1900s. Nathu La played an important
strategic role during the 1903-04 British expedition
to Tibet, supposedly meant to prevent the Russians
from extending their influence in Tibet. This mission,
led by Francis Younghusband, also signed a
Convention with the Tibetan government in 1904
with provisions for the frontier between Sikkim and
Tibet to be respected for free trade. Article I of the
1906 “Convention between Great Britain and
China Respecting Tibet” affirmed this provision of
the 1904 convention. In the years that followed,
trade permits were issued to monitor trade of high
value items like petrol and liquor.
The Nathu La trade study group set up by the
Government of Sikkim observed that trade was
initially through the barter system and it was during
the British rule in India that the Indian currency
came into use. After India’s independence, the
Chinese silver coin ‘dyang’ gained wider
acceptance in cross-border trade. Till the pass
was closed in 1962, electronic and textiles items
were exported from Sikkim and raw wool, silk,
medicinal plants, precious stones were imported
into India. Nathu La
also facilitated crossborder
movement of
people and the then
Indian Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru
used this pass to
travel to Bhutan in
1958.
After a long hiatus,
India and China
s i g n e d t h e
Memorandum on
Expanding Border
Trade in 2003. Article
2 o f t h e
M e m o r a n d u m
stipulated opening
of Nathu La, the
modalities for which
had already been
laid down in the Memorandum on the Resumption
of Border Trade signed in 1991 and the Protocol on
Entry and Exit Procedures for Border Trade signed
in 1992. Although border trade has nowhere been
explicitly defined in the WTO agreements, it implies
that cartographic lines that demarcate inter-state
boundaries should not act as stumbling blocks to
economic interaction. Further, border trade is
construed as being limited to people of the
border area and involves trade in a limited basket
of essential commodities of the region only. Nathu
La is the third Sino-Indian land border trade route
to be opened after Shipki La in Himachal Pradesh
and Gunji in Uttranchal. While trade through both
Shipki La and Gunji is negligible, it is envisaged
that in future Nathu La can be upgraded as a
trading route of massive commercial importance.
Under the terms of Article I of the 2003
Memorandum, India designated Changgu in
Sikkim and China designated Renqinggang in the
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as places for
border trade markets. The 29 items exportable
from India include agricultural implements,
clothes, barley, tea, rice, spices, oils, cycles,
copper products and tobacco. China’s export
basket consists of 15 items such as goat and
sheep skin, raw silk, yak tail, china clay, borax,
domestic animals and salt. A trader can trade
goods worth up to Rs.100,000/ per day. These
conditions have been imposed by India whereas
China has not imposed any such restrictions. The
border trade mart is open from May to November
in 2008 and trade is allowed five days a week.
The Nathu La study group estimated that proper
trade facilitation measures could result in bilateral
trade worth Rs.122 billion by 2015 through Nathu
La alone. The prognosis of the group was that
conservatively trade through the pass would be
close to Rs.5 billion by 2015. In fifty one days of
trading in 2006, India exported goods worth
Rs.885, 000 while it imported goods worth Rs.1.082
million. While Indian exports climbed up to Rs.2.876
million in six months of trade in 2007, Chinese
exports dipped to Rs.686, 000 for the same year.
The limited basket of commodities coupled with
inclement weather resulted in dampening of
trade volumes. Unfortunately, the ceremony on
the Indian side this year to mark the opening of
the trading season lacked the level of enthusiasm
seen in 2006 and the India-China Traders
Association for Sikkim has predicted a further dip in
the trade volumes in 2008. Hence, without
concerted efforts across both sides of the border
to expand the basket of tradable items as also
improve connectivity and logistics, trade across
The Nathu La study
group estimated that
proper trade facilitation
measures could result in
bilateral trade worth
Rs.122 billion by 2015
through Nathu La alone.
The prognosis of the
group was that
conservatively trade
through the pass would
be close to Rs.5 billion
by 2015.
NATHU LA PAGE 2
Nathu La will have symbolic significance and fall
far short of even the conservative targets
projected by the study group.
III
PASS AS BRIDGE
FROM KOLKATTA TO BEIJING
To augment border trade there should be a road
map to develop a trading highway providing
seamless connectivity between Lhasa in Tibet and
Kolkata and Haldia ports in West Bengal and even
the Chittagong port in Bangladesh. On the Indian
side, this would benefit the northeastern states. A
proposal to transform Siliguri as a transit and
transshipment point for trade with Tibet has
already been initiated through measures like
improved connectivity between Kolkata and
Siliguri along national highway 34.
The Border Roads Organisation has been assigned
the task of widening the 52km Gangtok-Nathu La
road by 2010. India also plans to build 27 new
roads covering the Sino-Indian border. These
initiatives may primarily be intended to ensure
movement of military forces, but would, in the
long run, definitely help facilitate border trade by
reducing transaction costs. Realizing the promise
of border trade with its neighbours, India has
already decided to establish a Land Ports
Authority of India and provide integrated checkposts
at select places as exists between Johar
Baru on the Malaysian side and Singapore.
Tibet also expects to benefit from resumption of
trade through Nathu La. At present, Indo-Tibetan
imports and exports are mostly channeled through
Tianjin, a port city near Beijing that involves a
detour of thousands of kilometers. Landlocked
Tibet, one of the poorest regions of China, with a
foreign trade of just US$200 million, would also
benefit from easy access to the Kolkata port.
Goods from China’s eastern and southern regions
will reach Tibet through this route rather than the
mountainous Beijing-Lhasa stretch which entails
higher transaction costs. Improvement in
infrastructure and an array of financial and
logistics services across the border would lead to
integrated economic development of the region.
Both countries appreciate the urgency of
mitigating inter-regional disparities within their
borders, since economic imbalances have fuelled
ethnic conflicts, fissiparous tendencies and
sectarian activities. Increased connectivity
between nations bridges their differences, leads to
economic spin-offs and reins in conflicts stemming
from deprivation and poverty. India has special
economic schemes for its northeastern regions.
Arunachal Pradesh has expressed hopes that
upgradation of its infrastructure and establishment
of trade marts at places like Kenzamane and
Bumla in Tawang
d i s trict and
G e l l i n g
(Kepangla pass)
in Upper Siang
district along the
S i n o - I n d i a n
border would
invigorate its
e c o n o m y .
U p b e a t
sentiments were
also expressed
from across the
border by Hao
P e n g , Vice
Chairman of TAR
who stated that
“the reopening
of Nathu La will
h e l p e n d
economic isolation of this area and also boost the
transportation, construction and service industries,
paving the way for a major trade route that
connects China and South Asia.”
China wants to link its relatively backward western
regions with South Asia in tune with the
comprehensive periphery policy which it has been
evolving since the 1980s. The Qinghai-Tibet
Railway and the Sino-Pakistan Friendship Highway
will enable China to deepen its economic
interdependence with South Asia. China is aiming
to interlace its regional economic diplomacy with
the ideology of ‘peaceful rise’ to reassure smaller
neighbours that it wants to connect its
southwestern regions to South Asia in the same
way as its prosperous coastal provinces are
connected to Hong Kong and Taiwan.
At a regional level, the opening of Nathu La
coupled with other initiatives like the Mekong-
Ganga Cooperation, the Kunming Initiative and
proposed development of the Stilwell Road would
link northeastern India, Southeast Asian countries
like Thailand and Myanmar, South Asian countries
like Bangladesh and Nepal and southwestern
NO 73 PAGE 3
China wants to link its
relatively backward western
regions with South Asia in
tune with the
comprehensive periphery
policy which it has been
evolving since the 1980s.
The Qinghai-Tibet Railway
and the Sino-Pakistan
Friendship Highway will
enable China to deepen its
economic interdependence
with South Asia.
border cooperation at mutually agreed sites with
the objective of transforming their border from
being a dividing line into a bridge that unites them
in cooperative pursuits.” The same declaration
also affirmed that “the two sides shall strengthen
border trade through the existing locations, while
continuing to explore the possibility of opening
additional trading routes.” Thus, Chinese intrusions
into the Indian territory as seen recently in Sikkim
and Ladakh negate both the letter of the 2005
Agreement and the spirit of the 2006 declaration.
As a great power on the rise, it is strategically
necessary that New Delhi maintains peace and
tranquility along its borders.
Better connectivity and infrastructural facilities in
the region would result in greater tourist
movements. On the occasion of the opening of
Nathu La pass for trade the Sikkim Chief Minister,
Pawan Kumar Chamling, said, “this is not just a
trade route, but a cultural highway.” The Chinese
Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi, hoped that a bus
service between Gangtok and Lhasa would be a
reality in the future. Visit of Tibetans to places like
Rumtek Monastry and Indians to Kailash
Mansaravor would be facilitated through the
Nathu La. Increased people-to-people contacts
promotes inter-state understanding and
appreciation of each other’s history and culture
helps alleviate conflict situations.
As long as China’s presence in South Asia is
benign, India and China can foster deeper
cooperative relationships through regional trade
and economic integration. Bilateral confidence
displayed by opening border trade could deepen
regionalism and have a positive effect on other
politico-strategic issues like institutionalized
defence cooperation, which the two countries
have already established.
About the Author
Satyajit Mohanty is currently with the Indian Revenue
Service. He did his M.A & M.Phil in International Relations
from Jawaharlal Nehru University.
The views expressed in this essay are personal.
Chinese provinces like Yunnan. Nepal is also
banking on Tibet’s development and deepened
trade and transport links to develop its own
mountainous northern districts. Bangladesh has
also expressed optimism over the opening of
Nathu La, as it foresees Chinese goods crossing
Nathu La to reach Southeast Asia via the
Chittagong port.
On the political front, the opening of Nathu La
marked a new high in Sino-Indian camaraderie.
China, for long, had claimed Sikkim to be its own
territory. Sikkim enjoyed the status of a
protectorate state of India until 1975 when it
became part of the Union of India. However,
China refused to recognize this and Sikkim
witnessed repeated incursions by the People’s
Liberation Army in the 1960s. The PLA’s attack on
the Indian army in September 1967 and our strong
reply is well-documented. For India, the opening
of Nathu La marked a firm recognition by China
that Sikkim is an integral part of its territory. On its
part, China is satisfied that India has recognized
TAR as its integral part.
In the early 1990s, the Indian army had voiced
concerns about security hazards related to the
opening of the Nathu La for trade. A series of
CSBMs since the 1990s and efforts to replace
deterrence with reassurance have resulted in a
positive milieu for conducting bilateral relations.
Increased security through greater trade and
cross-border movement of people and not
through greater deployment of troops not only
might result in economic prosperity but also
redirect part of the defence spending towards
developmental expenditure.
IV
CONCLUSIONS
Improved cross-border trade could inhibit the
unresolved border issue from flaring up and have
a salubrious effect on border talks. As per Article IX
of the 2005 Agreement on the Political Parameters
and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the
India-China Boundary Question, both countries
shall maintain peace and status quo along the
border pending final settlement of the boundary
issue.
During the visit of Hu Jiantao to India in 2006, a 10-
point joint declaration was signed which provided
that “both sides shall promote greater trans-
INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND
CONFLICT STUDIES
B-7/3, Safdarjung Enclave, New
Delhi, India, 110029
Tel: 91-11-4100 1900
NATHU LA PAGE 4
By Satyajit Mohanty
Indian Revenue Service
A significant decision of the 2006 Sino-Indian
Friendship Year was to reopen the Nathu La
(pass) for trade. Nathu La was closed following
the 1962 Sino-Indian war and its reopening had
both symbolic and economic significance for
India and China. Interestingly, the “Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of
India and the Government of the People’s
Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse
between Tibet Region of China and India.” in
1954 specifically recognized the need to establish
additional trading points and facilitate an open
border where pilgrims and local inhabitants could
move across the border without legal hassles.
Popularly known as the Panchsheel Agreement, it
forms the foundation of Sino-Indian Confidence
and Security Building Measures (CSBMs).
I
BILATERAL RELATIONS
SIGNIFICANCE OF TRADE
Before analyzing the impact of the reopening of
the 14,140 feet Nathu La on Sino-Indian bilateral
relations, it would be pertinent to seek some sort
of answer to a seemingly simple question – does
increased trade between nations dampen or
exacerbate conflict? This question has generated
a variegated response cutting across a broad
spectrum of theoretical literature. Realism argues
that state capabilities, measured primarily in
terms of military power, determine state
behaviour. Cooperation in the international
system is not possible as relative rather than
absolute gains that states derive from such
cooperation affects the balance of power.
By contrast, the liberal tradition gives importance
to state preferences, rather than state
capabilities. Free trade ushers in economic
prosperity and interdependence and the result is a
rise in the costs of war which rational states avoid.
Taking off from these debates, Dale Copeland
argued that expectations of future trade and
resultant gains would encourage dependent states
to assign a high value to continuation of peaceful
trade, making war a less appealing option.
Suffice it to say, indexed in Purchasing Power Parity
terms, China and India are projected to be the top
two economies of the world by 2050. Sino-Indian
bilateral trade has become increasingly
complementary increasing from a paltry US$339
million in 1992 to US$25,734 in 2007-08. As per the
report of India-China Joint Study Group on
Comprehensive Trade and Economic Cooperation,
the average annual growth rate of trade at 26.4
per cent during 1995-2003, had been higher than
the average growth rate of trade for either China or
India during the same period.
China overtook the US as India’s largest trading
partner in 2007-08. When compared to 2005-06,
bilateral trade grew by 46 per cent in 2006-07.
Given the buoyancy in Sino-Indian trade, the target
of US$40 billion trade by 2010 was revised upwards
to US$60 billion during the visit of Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh to Beijing in January 2008.
Opening of the Nathu La and other land routes for
cross-border trade in future would help achieve this
goal.
II
NATHU LA
BREAKING THE BARRIER
Nathu La formed a part of the ancient silk route
and formal trade linkages between British India and
Tibet through the mountainous passes date back to
the late 18th century. Early in the 19th century, the
Satyajit Mohanty
Indian Revenue Service
IPCS ISSUE BRIEF
British annexed large tracts of the territories of
Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal and trade through the
various passes increased further. Trade in this
region accounted for 80 per cent of total border
trade volume between India and China in the
early 1900s. Nathu La played an important
strategic role during the 1903-04 British expedition
to Tibet, supposedly meant to prevent the Russians
from extending their influence in Tibet. This mission,
led by Francis Younghusband, also signed a
Convention with the Tibetan government in 1904
with provisions for the frontier between Sikkim and
Tibet to be respected for free trade. Article I of the
1906 “Convention between Great Britain and
China Respecting Tibet” affirmed this provision of
the 1904 convention. In the years that followed,
trade permits were issued to monitor trade of high
value items like petrol and liquor.
The Nathu La trade study group set up by the
Government of Sikkim observed that trade was
initially through the barter system and it was during
the British rule in India that the Indian currency
came into use. After India’s independence, the
Chinese silver coin ‘dyang’ gained wider
acceptance in cross-border trade. Till the pass
was closed in 1962, electronic and textiles items
were exported from Sikkim and raw wool, silk,
medicinal plants, precious stones were imported
into India. Nathu La
also facilitated crossborder
movement of
people and the then
Indian Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru
used this pass to
travel to Bhutan in
1958.
After a long hiatus,
India and China
s i g n e d t h e
Memorandum on
Expanding Border
Trade in 2003. Article
2 o f t h e
M e m o r a n d u m
stipulated opening
of Nathu La, the
modalities for which
had already been
laid down in the Memorandum on the Resumption
of Border Trade signed in 1991 and the Protocol on
Entry and Exit Procedures for Border Trade signed
in 1992. Although border trade has nowhere been
explicitly defined in the WTO agreements, it implies
that cartographic lines that demarcate inter-state
boundaries should not act as stumbling blocks to
economic interaction. Further, border trade is
construed as being limited to people of the
border area and involves trade in a limited basket
of essential commodities of the region only. Nathu
La is the third Sino-Indian land border trade route
to be opened after Shipki La in Himachal Pradesh
and Gunji in Uttranchal. While trade through both
Shipki La and Gunji is negligible, it is envisaged
that in future Nathu La can be upgraded as a
trading route of massive commercial importance.
Under the terms of Article I of the 2003
Memorandum, India designated Changgu in
Sikkim and China designated Renqinggang in the
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as places for
border trade markets. The 29 items exportable
from India include agricultural implements,
clothes, barley, tea, rice, spices, oils, cycles,
copper products and tobacco. China’s export
basket consists of 15 items such as goat and
sheep skin, raw silk, yak tail, china clay, borax,
domestic animals and salt. A trader can trade
goods worth up to Rs.100,000/ per day. These
conditions have been imposed by India whereas
China has not imposed any such restrictions. The
border trade mart is open from May to November
in 2008 and trade is allowed five days a week.
The Nathu La study group estimated that proper
trade facilitation measures could result in bilateral
trade worth Rs.122 billion by 2015 through Nathu
La alone. The prognosis of the group was that
conservatively trade through the pass would be
close to Rs.5 billion by 2015. In fifty one days of
trading in 2006, India exported goods worth
Rs.885, 000 while it imported goods worth Rs.1.082
million. While Indian exports climbed up to Rs.2.876
million in six months of trade in 2007, Chinese
exports dipped to Rs.686, 000 for the same year.
The limited basket of commodities coupled with
inclement weather resulted in dampening of
trade volumes. Unfortunately, the ceremony on
the Indian side this year to mark the opening of
the trading season lacked the level of enthusiasm
seen in 2006 and the India-China Traders
Association for Sikkim has predicted a further dip in
the trade volumes in 2008. Hence, without
concerted efforts across both sides of the border
to expand the basket of tradable items as also
improve connectivity and logistics, trade across
The Nathu La study
group estimated that
proper trade facilitation
measures could result in
bilateral trade worth
Rs.122 billion by 2015
through Nathu La alone.
The prognosis of the
group was that
conservatively trade
through the pass would
be close to Rs.5 billion
by 2015.
NATHU LA PAGE 2
Nathu La will have symbolic significance and fall
far short of even the conservative targets
projected by the study group.
III
PASS AS BRIDGE
FROM KOLKATTA TO BEIJING
To augment border trade there should be a road
map to develop a trading highway providing
seamless connectivity between Lhasa in Tibet and
Kolkata and Haldia ports in West Bengal and even
the Chittagong port in Bangladesh. On the Indian
side, this would benefit the northeastern states. A
proposal to transform Siliguri as a transit and
transshipment point for trade with Tibet has
already been initiated through measures like
improved connectivity between Kolkata and
Siliguri along national highway 34.
The Border Roads Organisation has been assigned
the task of widening the 52km Gangtok-Nathu La
road by 2010. India also plans to build 27 new
roads covering the Sino-Indian border. These
initiatives may primarily be intended to ensure
movement of military forces, but would, in the
long run, definitely help facilitate border trade by
reducing transaction costs. Realizing the promise
of border trade with its neighbours, India has
already decided to establish a Land Ports
Authority of India and provide integrated checkposts
at select places as exists between Johar
Baru on the Malaysian side and Singapore.
Tibet also expects to benefit from resumption of
trade through Nathu La. At present, Indo-Tibetan
imports and exports are mostly channeled through
Tianjin, a port city near Beijing that involves a
detour of thousands of kilometers. Landlocked
Tibet, one of the poorest regions of China, with a
foreign trade of just US$200 million, would also
benefit from easy access to the Kolkata port.
Goods from China’s eastern and southern regions
will reach Tibet through this route rather than the
mountainous Beijing-Lhasa stretch which entails
higher transaction costs. Improvement in
infrastructure and an array of financial and
logistics services across the border would lead to
integrated economic development of the region.
Both countries appreciate the urgency of
mitigating inter-regional disparities within their
borders, since economic imbalances have fuelled
ethnic conflicts, fissiparous tendencies and
sectarian activities. Increased connectivity
between nations bridges their differences, leads to
economic spin-offs and reins in conflicts stemming
from deprivation and poverty. India has special
economic schemes for its northeastern regions.
Arunachal Pradesh has expressed hopes that
upgradation of its infrastructure and establishment
of trade marts at places like Kenzamane and
Bumla in Tawang
d i s trict and
G e l l i n g
(Kepangla pass)
in Upper Siang
district along the
S i n o - I n d i a n
border would
invigorate its
e c o n o m y .
U p b e a t
sentiments were
also expressed
from across the
border by Hao
P e n g , Vice
Chairman of TAR
who stated that
“the reopening
of Nathu La will
h e l p e n d
economic isolation of this area and also boost the
transportation, construction and service industries,
paving the way for a major trade route that
connects China and South Asia.”
China wants to link its relatively backward western
regions with South Asia in tune with the
comprehensive periphery policy which it has been
evolving since the 1980s. The Qinghai-Tibet
Railway and the Sino-Pakistan Friendship Highway
will enable China to deepen its economic
interdependence with South Asia. China is aiming
to interlace its regional economic diplomacy with
the ideology of ‘peaceful rise’ to reassure smaller
neighbours that it wants to connect its
southwestern regions to South Asia in the same
way as its prosperous coastal provinces are
connected to Hong Kong and Taiwan.
At a regional level, the opening of Nathu La
coupled with other initiatives like the Mekong-
Ganga Cooperation, the Kunming Initiative and
proposed development of the Stilwell Road would
link northeastern India, Southeast Asian countries
like Thailand and Myanmar, South Asian countries
like Bangladesh and Nepal and southwestern
NO 73 PAGE 3
China wants to link its
relatively backward western
regions with South Asia in
tune with the
comprehensive periphery
policy which it has been
evolving since the 1980s.
The Qinghai-Tibet Railway
and the Sino-Pakistan
Friendship Highway will
enable China to deepen its
economic interdependence
with South Asia.
border cooperation at mutually agreed sites with
the objective of transforming their border from
being a dividing line into a bridge that unites them
in cooperative pursuits.” The same declaration
also affirmed that “the two sides shall strengthen
border trade through the existing locations, while
continuing to explore the possibility of opening
additional trading routes.” Thus, Chinese intrusions
into the Indian territory as seen recently in Sikkim
and Ladakh negate both the letter of the 2005
Agreement and the spirit of the 2006 declaration.
As a great power on the rise, it is strategically
necessary that New Delhi maintains peace and
tranquility along its borders.
Better connectivity and infrastructural facilities in
the region would result in greater tourist
movements. On the occasion of the opening of
Nathu La pass for trade the Sikkim Chief Minister,
Pawan Kumar Chamling, said, “this is not just a
trade route, but a cultural highway.” The Chinese
Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi, hoped that a bus
service between Gangtok and Lhasa would be a
reality in the future. Visit of Tibetans to places like
Rumtek Monastry and Indians to Kailash
Mansaravor would be facilitated through the
Nathu La. Increased people-to-people contacts
promotes inter-state understanding and
appreciation of each other’s history and culture
helps alleviate conflict situations.
As long as China’s presence in South Asia is
benign, India and China can foster deeper
cooperative relationships through regional trade
and economic integration. Bilateral confidence
displayed by opening border trade could deepen
regionalism and have a positive effect on other
politico-strategic issues like institutionalized
defence cooperation, which the two countries
have already established.
About the Author
Satyajit Mohanty is currently with the Indian Revenue
Service. He did his M.A & M.Phil in International Relations
from Jawaharlal Nehru University.
The views expressed in this essay are personal.
Chinese provinces like Yunnan. Nepal is also
banking on Tibet’s development and deepened
trade and transport links to develop its own
mountainous northern districts. Bangladesh has
also expressed optimism over the opening of
Nathu La, as it foresees Chinese goods crossing
Nathu La to reach Southeast Asia via the
Chittagong port.
On the political front, the opening of Nathu La
marked a new high in Sino-Indian camaraderie.
China, for long, had claimed Sikkim to be its own
territory. Sikkim enjoyed the status of a
protectorate state of India until 1975 when it
became part of the Union of India. However,
China refused to recognize this and Sikkim
witnessed repeated incursions by the People’s
Liberation Army in the 1960s. The PLA’s attack on
the Indian army in September 1967 and our strong
reply is well-documented. For India, the opening
of Nathu La marked a firm recognition by China
that Sikkim is an integral part of its territory. On its
part, China is satisfied that India has recognized
TAR as its integral part.
In the early 1990s, the Indian army had voiced
concerns about security hazards related to the
opening of the Nathu La for trade. A series of
CSBMs since the 1990s and efforts to replace
deterrence with reassurance have resulted in a
positive milieu for conducting bilateral relations.
Increased security through greater trade and
cross-border movement of people and not
through greater deployment of troops not only
might result in economic prosperity but also
redirect part of the defence spending towards
developmental expenditure.
IV
CONCLUSIONS
Improved cross-border trade could inhibit the
unresolved border issue from flaring up and have
a salubrious effect on border talks. As per Article IX
of the 2005 Agreement on the Political Parameters
and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the
India-China Boundary Question, both countries
shall maintain peace and status quo along the
border pending final settlement of the boundary
issue.
During the visit of Hu Jiantao to India in 2006, a 10-
point joint declaration was signed which provided
that “both sides shall promote greater trans-
INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND
CONFLICT STUDIES
B-7/3, Safdarjung Enclave, New
Delhi, India, 110029
Tel: 91-11-4100 1900
NATHU LA PAGE 4
Monday, September 14, 2009
INDIA/CHINA: Is ITBP Jawans injured with Chinese bullets?
Posted by barunroy on September 15, 2009
FROM HAALKHABAR.COM
As per a national media source, bubbles strains along the mountainous frontier with China appear to have become serious with a revelation that two jawans of the Indo – Tibetan Border Police, the sentinel force along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), were injured in bullets fired from the Chinese side.
‘The firing in an area identified as Kerang in northern Sikkim took place a fortnight ago but has been kept under wraps. It was confirmed on Monday by a highly-placed intelligence source, who is not authorised to give information to the media. ITBP officials at its headquarters in New Delhi declined to confirm the incident’, newspaper mentioned.
It was the first incidents where bullets have been fired since the landmark 1996 Sino-India agreement in which both sides pledged not to open fire, no matter what the provocation, as a part of confidence-building measures.
Sources cite this as yet another instance of China’s maintaining pressure on the 2.1 sq km area of `Finger Tip’ in northern Sikkim. Last year, China had sent a vehicle-mounted patrol into this area, penetrating 1 km into Indian Territory. The Kerang shootout prompted an unscheduled border personnel meeting on August 30.
Also last week, the entire situation along the LAC was reviewed in a war game by the Eastern Command top brass in Kolkata’s Fort William, Eastern Command HQs, in the presence of Army chief General Deepak Kapoor.
Violations aren’t new but have rarely involved casualties. What is alarming is the report of shooting along the LAC which has remained peaceful for decades since the Chinese invasion of 1962.
In contrast, the Kerang incident could be a significant and dangerous deviation from the practice of talks before bullets.
Despite ceremonial border personnel meetings (BPMs) at Nathu La in Sikkim and Bum La and Kibithu in Arunachal, Chinese troops continue to violate the LAC with brazen regularity, mentioned in news.
Posted by barunroy on September 15, 2009
FROM HAALKHABAR.COM
As per a national media source, bubbles strains along the mountainous frontier with China appear to have become serious with a revelation that two jawans of the Indo – Tibetan Border Police, the sentinel force along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), were injured in bullets fired from the Chinese side.
‘The firing in an area identified as Kerang in northern Sikkim took place a fortnight ago but has been kept under wraps. It was confirmed on Monday by a highly-placed intelligence source, who is not authorised to give information to the media. ITBP officials at its headquarters in New Delhi declined to confirm the incident’, newspaper mentioned.
It was the first incidents where bullets have been fired since the landmark 1996 Sino-India agreement in which both sides pledged not to open fire, no matter what the provocation, as a part of confidence-building measures.
Sources cite this as yet another instance of China’s maintaining pressure on the 2.1 sq km area of `Finger Tip’ in northern Sikkim. Last year, China had sent a vehicle-mounted patrol into this area, penetrating 1 km into Indian Territory. The Kerang shootout prompted an unscheduled border personnel meeting on August 30.
Also last week, the entire situation along the LAC was reviewed in a war game by the Eastern Command top brass in Kolkata’s Fort William, Eastern Command HQs, in the presence of Army chief General Deepak Kapoor.
Violations aren’t new but have rarely involved casualties. What is alarming is the report of shooting along the LAC which has remained peaceful for decades since the Chinese invasion of 1962.
In contrast, the Kerang incident could be a significant and dangerous deviation from the practice of talks before bullets.
Despite ceremonial border personnel meetings (BPMs) at Nathu La in Sikkim and Bum La and Kibithu in Arunachal, Chinese troops continue to violate the LAC with brazen regularity, mentioned in news.
Friday, September 11, 2009
Military Buildup Across the Himalayas: A Shaky Balance
Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 18September 10, 2009 04:19 PM Age: 14 hrsCategory: China Brief, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, South Asia,
By: Vijay Sakhuja
In less than one year, China and India will celebrate six decades of bilateral relations capped by festivities in their respective country. This period, however, has been marked by a border war in 1962 that precipitated a long phase of antagonism and hostility between the two sides. Yet, there were several positive trends in their bilateral relations since the late 1980s that buoy the decline in mutual trust: regular high level political interactions; increasing bilateral trade that may reach $60 billion in 2010; boundary demarcation talks since 2003; and joint military exercises, which included two ‘anti terror’ exercises in 2007 and 2008. Most recently, during border talks in August in New Delhi, the two sides agreed to ‘seek a political solution’ to the boundary problems and work towards ‘safeguarding the peace and calmness in the areas along the border’ (Xinhua News Agency, August 6).
Notwithstanding these positive trends, the two Asian powers still suffer from a trust deficit and are increasingly concerned about each other's strategic intent, particularly over their respective military developments across the Himalayas. The Chinese side has specifically warned India of its ‘military initiatives’ in Arunachal Pradesh, a northeastern state of India that includes Tawang—home to one of Tibetan Buddhism’s most sacred monasteries—and claimed by Beijing (Asia Times, July 10), and New Delhi has raised the specter of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ‘systematic upgrading of infrastructure, reconnaissance and surveillance, quick response and operational capabilities in the border areas’ (Indian Express, July 12). Besides border intrusion, incursions, air space violation and even on one occasion an ambush by PLA soldiers (Tibetanreview.net, August 11) are causing immense concern to the Indian army. In 2008, there were reportedly “270 border violations and nearly 2,300 instances of ‘aggressive border patrolling’ by Chinese soldiers” (New York Times, September 4). Although leaders on both sides try to downplay the border sparring, there is ample evidence pointing to the further augmentation of defense forces and military infrastructure along the border. This could be the harbinger of a spiraling arms race.
Geographical Determinants
Geography is an important factor in the military infrastructure developments along the India-China border. A large part of China’s border lies along the flat Tibetan plateau, which gives China the advantages of higher operational and logistical capability for strategic planning during a military contingency. These favorable geographical settings allowed China to build an extensive network of roads, railheads, forward airfields, pipelines and logistic hubs that appear geared toward supporting military operations. Moreover, China is reportedly deploying intercontinental missiles such as the DF-31 and DF-31A at Delingha, north of Tibet, which can strike targets in northern India (Asia Times, July 9).
Unlike China, Indian troops are deployed on high mountains and have to negotiate a tougher terrain comprising of snow capped peaks, deep valleys, thick jungles and difficult mountain passes. Some of the Indian army posts can be accessed only during favorable weather conditions by animal transport and human porters [1]. Furthermore, a number of forward posts can only be serviced by helicopters for troop induction, logistics support and casualty evacuation. In essence, China enjoys geographical advantage and has built a sophisticated logistic network for conducting offensive operations against India.
Military Infrastructure
China has established a long distance rail link between Beijing and Lhasa and this service would later be extended to Xigaze, South of Lhasa, and then to Yatung, near Nathu La passes [2]. Further, Lhasa would be connected to Nyingchi, just north of Arunachal Pradesh, and the rail network would then run along the Brahmaputra River and the Sino-Indian border to Kunming in Yunnan. The rail project, when complete, would be a technological marvel, but it will be useful to keep in mind that it is being developed on the Tibetan plateau, and thus can provide China with a strategic advantage by enhancing the PLA’s logistic supply chain.
Furthermore, the Chinese authorities have announced plans to widen the Karakoram Highway, which links China to Pakistan, from the existing 10 meters width to 30 meters to allow heavier vehicles to pass throughout the year. According to an Indian military analyst, China has deployed “13 Border Defence Regiments, the 52 Mountain Infantry Brigade to protect Southern Qinghai-Tibet region, the 53 Mountain Infantry Brigade to protect the high plateau in the Western sector, the 149th Division of the 13th Group Army in the Eastern Sector and the 61st Division of the 21st Group Army in the Western Sector” [3]. This is a substantial military concentration, which can provide a forceful initial response in case of a breakout of hostilities across the Himalayas.
Similarly, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has established airfields at Hoping, Pangta and Kong Ka, two airfields at Lhasa and an additional four in the region that can be rapidly operationalized [4]. Beyond just supporting fighter aircraft, these air bases have enhanced PLA airlift capability that includes division strength of troops (20,000), air-drop a brigade (3,500 troops) and helicopter lift of approximately two battalions. These figures are for a single lift [5].
In mid-August 2009, the PLA commenced a major military exercise that would be conducted over two months. The war game code named ‘Stride-2009’ (Kuayue-2009) involves nearly 50,000 troops drawn from the military regions of Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan and Guangzhou, who would conduct operations over long distances. Significantly, one of the primary aims of the exercises is to test the PLA’s ‘capacity of long-range projection’ (Xinhua News Agency, August 11). The exercise would also marshal civilian assets such as high-speed trains traveling up to 350 kilometers per hour and commercial aircraft to move troops over long distances (China Daily [Beijing], August 12). According to Ni Lexiong, a military analyst at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, “This is really about a rapid response to sudden events in Tibet and Xinjiang, but also the military will play an increasing role in moving supplies and responding to disasters” (Startribune.com [Canada], August 11).
China's sprawling military infrastructure provides the PLA with a strong logistic back up, which enables the rapid deployment of troops and a robust offensive capability. India, on the other hand, is constrained by geography. In June 2009, General J.J. Singh, the governor of Arunachal Pradesh and former chief of the Indian Army stated, “Two army divisions comprising 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers each will be deployed along the border in Arunachal’ and “[deployment] was part of the planned augmentation of our capabilities to defend the country ... The increase in force strength is to meet the future national security challenge” (Reuters, June 8). These two divisions are specially trained in mountain warfare and would augment the number of Indian troops to 120,000 (Stratpost.com, June 8).
Soon thereafter, in July 2009, the Indian Air Force (IAF) announced that it had planned to forward-deploy two squadrons (18 aircraft each) of Su-30 MKI advanced fighter jets at its airbase in Tezpur (150 kilometers south of the Chinese border) in Arunachal Pradesh. According to the IAF chief, “We have plans to improve infrastructure in the north-east. We’re upgrading four-five airfields and Advanced Landing Grounds (ALG). We’re also going to be basing a fleet of Sukhoi-30s in Tezpur in addition to the existing MiG 21s fighter jets” (Stratpost.com, July 21). The ALGs are strategically located at Daulat Beg Oldie and in Chushul on the border with Aksai Chin in the proximity of Karakoram Highway. In addition, the IAF has plans to position Su-30 MKIs at Chabua and Jorhat in Assam, Panagarh in West Bengal and Purnea in Bihar (Sifynews.com, July 10).
Interestingly, there is a maritime dimension to the military developments in the Himalayas. Located at an altitude of 14,500 feet, the Pangong Lake is under the control of both China (90 kilometers) and India (45 kilometers), but a stretch of about 5 km is disputed (Indian Express, October 6, 2008). Both sides have positioned patrol vessels and conduct routine surveillance. There have been regular incidents of transgression and incursions but both sides have exercised restraint and adopted a standard drill that helps disengagement; when boats from both sides come face to face with each other, they raise flags and shout ‘hindi chini bhai bhai’ (Indian and Chinese are brothers) and disengage. China operates 22 boats manned by 5-7 personnel each and India has deployed 2 large boats operated by 21 personnel each. In 2008, the Indian navy chief had visited the lake and India has plans to augment its capability by deploying more boats in the lake (Indian Express, October 7, 2008).
The Indian Ministry of Defense Report 2008-2009 has expressed concerns over China’s military capabilities and observed that ‘greater transparency and openness’ is critical but on a conciliatory note also stated that India will ‘engage China, while taking all necessary measures to protect its national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty’ (Indian Express, July 12). There are fears in India about China’s military modernization and augmentation of military infrastructure along the borders. China has been increasing its defense budget on a regular basis and in 2009 it announced a 14.9 percent rise in military spending to 480.6 billion renminbi ($70.3 billion) marking 21 years of double-digit growth (Defence.pk, March 4). Yet, unofficial estimates place the total amount much higher than the figures the Chinese government claims.
The Indian military leadership has expressed concern about the growing military power potential of China. Admiral Sureesh Mehta, chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, categorically stated that “In military terms, both conventionally and unconventionally, we can neither have the capability nor the intention to match China force for force …” but cautioned that as China consolidates itself and builds its comprehensive national power and a powerful military, it is “likely to be more assertive on its claims, especially in the immediate neighborhood [sic].” Further, “It is quite evident that coping with China will certainly be one of our [India] primary challenges in the years ahead. Our trust deficit with China can never be liquidated unless our boundary problems are resolved” (Zeenews.com, August 10).
In the 21st Century, China and India have emerged as major Asian powers and are engaged in building their respective strengths. The current trends in their bilateral political and economic relations augers well for Asian prosperity. Yet, the slow pace of talks on demarcation and delineation of the boundary (commenced in 2003), military infrastructure developments along the border, are some of the issues that remain uppermost in the minds of Indian planners and strategic analysts. The boundary dispute gains greater salience given the fact that China has resolved its boundary disputes with most of its neighbors, while its dispute with India remains unresolved. It is fair to argue that China is biding time to build its comprehensive national power including military capability reflected in Deng Xiaoping’s thought “tao guang yang hui," which literally translates as "hide brightness, nourish obscurity," and in Beijing’s interpretation, "Bide our time and build up our capabilities" and then challenge India at the time of its choosing.
Notes
1. Author's discussions with retired Indian army officers in August 2009.
2. Shailender Arya, “The Train to Lhasa’ Journal of Defence Studies, winter 2008.
3. Rajan, D.S. 2009. ‘China: Media Anger on Arunachal Pradesh Continues Unabated’, SAAG Paper No. 3260, June 18, 2009.
4. Arun Sehgal, “Military Moves and Reactions: The PLA’s Profile in Tibet is Increasing in Strength and Sophistication”, Pragati: The Indian National Interest Review, No 28, July 2009, pp.15-18.
5. Ibid.
Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 18September 10, 2009 04:19 PM Age: 14 hrsCategory: China Brief, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, South Asia,
By: Vijay Sakhuja
In less than one year, China and India will celebrate six decades of bilateral relations capped by festivities in their respective country. This period, however, has been marked by a border war in 1962 that precipitated a long phase of antagonism and hostility between the two sides. Yet, there were several positive trends in their bilateral relations since the late 1980s that buoy the decline in mutual trust: regular high level political interactions; increasing bilateral trade that may reach $60 billion in 2010; boundary demarcation talks since 2003; and joint military exercises, which included two ‘anti terror’ exercises in 2007 and 2008. Most recently, during border talks in August in New Delhi, the two sides agreed to ‘seek a political solution’ to the boundary problems and work towards ‘safeguarding the peace and calmness in the areas along the border’ (Xinhua News Agency, August 6).
Notwithstanding these positive trends, the two Asian powers still suffer from a trust deficit and are increasingly concerned about each other's strategic intent, particularly over their respective military developments across the Himalayas. The Chinese side has specifically warned India of its ‘military initiatives’ in Arunachal Pradesh, a northeastern state of India that includes Tawang—home to one of Tibetan Buddhism’s most sacred monasteries—and claimed by Beijing (Asia Times, July 10), and New Delhi has raised the specter of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ‘systematic upgrading of infrastructure, reconnaissance and surveillance, quick response and operational capabilities in the border areas’ (Indian Express, July 12). Besides border intrusion, incursions, air space violation and even on one occasion an ambush by PLA soldiers (Tibetanreview.net, August 11) are causing immense concern to the Indian army. In 2008, there were reportedly “270 border violations and nearly 2,300 instances of ‘aggressive border patrolling’ by Chinese soldiers” (New York Times, September 4). Although leaders on both sides try to downplay the border sparring, there is ample evidence pointing to the further augmentation of defense forces and military infrastructure along the border. This could be the harbinger of a spiraling arms race.
Geographical Determinants
Geography is an important factor in the military infrastructure developments along the India-China border. A large part of China’s border lies along the flat Tibetan plateau, which gives China the advantages of higher operational and logistical capability for strategic planning during a military contingency. These favorable geographical settings allowed China to build an extensive network of roads, railheads, forward airfields, pipelines and logistic hubs that appear geared toward supporting military operations. Moreover, China is reportedly deploying intercontinental missiles such as the DF-31 and DF-31A at Delingha, north of Tibet, which can strike targets in northern India (Asia Times, July 9).
Unlike China, Indian troops are deployed on high mountains and have to negotiate a tougher terrain comprising of snow capped peaks, deep valleys, thick jungles and difficult mountain passes. Some of the Indian army posts can be accessed only during favorable weather conditions by animal transport and human porters [1]. Furthermore, a number of forward posts can only be serviced by helicopters for troop induction, logistics support and casualty evacuation. In essence, China enjoys geographical advantage and has built a sophisticated logistic network for conducting offensive operations against India.
Military Infrastructure
China has established a long distance rail link between Beijing and Lhasa and this service would later be extended to Xigaze, South of Lhasa, and then to Yatung, near Nathu La passes [2]. Further, Lhasa would be connected to Nyingchi, just north of Arunachal Pradesh, and the rail network would then run along the Brahmaputra River and the Sino-Indian border to Kunming in Yunnan. The rail project, when complete, would be a technological marvel, but it will be useful to keep in mind that it is being developed on the Tibetan plateau, and thus can provide China with a strategic advantage by enhancing the PLA’s logistic supply chain.
Furthermore, the Chinese authorities have announced plans to widen the Karakoram Highway, which links China to Pakistan, from the existing 10 meters width to 30 meters to allow heavier vehicles to pass throughout the year. According to an Indian military analyst, China has deployed “13 Border Defence Regiments, the 52 Mountain Infantry Brigade to protect Southern Qinghai-Tibet region, the 53 Mountain Infantry Brigade to protect the high plateau in the Western sector, the 149th Division of the 13th Group Army in the Eastern Sector and the 61st Division of the 21st Group Army in the Western Sector” [3]. This is a substantial military concentration, which can provide a forceful initial response in case of a breakout of hostilities across the Himalayas.
Similarly, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has established airfields at Hoping, Pangta and Kong Ka, two airfields at Lhasa and an additional four in the region that can be rapidly operationalized [4]. Beyond just supporting fighter aircraft, these air bases have enhanced PLA airlift capability that includes division strength of troops (20,000), air-drop a brigade (3,500 troops) and helicopter lift of approximately two battalions. These figures are for a single lift [5].
In mid-August 2009, the PLA commenced a major military exercise that would be conducted over two months. The war game code named ‘Stride-2009’ (Kuayue-2009) involves nearly 50,000 troops drawn from the military regions of Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan and Guangzhou, who would conduct operations over long distances. Significantly, one of the primary aims of the exercises is to test the PLA’s ‘capacity of long-range projection’ (Xinhua News Agency, August 11). The exercise would also marshal civilian assets such as high-speed trains traveling up to 350 kilometers per hour and commercial aircraft to move troops over long distances (China Daily [Beijing], August 12). According to Ni Lexiong, a military analyst at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, “This is really about a rapid response to sudden events in Tibet and Xinjiang, but also the military will play an increasing role in moving supplies and responding to disasters” (Startribune.com [Canada], August 11).
China's sprawling military infrastructure provides the PLA with a strong logistic back up, which enables the rapid deployment of troops and a robust offensive capability. India, on the other hand, is constrained by geography. In June 2009, General J.J. Singh, the governor of Arunachal Pradesh and former chief of the Indian Army stated, “Two army divisions comprising 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers each will be deployed along the border in Arunachal’ and “[deployment] was part of the planned augmentation of our capabilities to defend the country ... The increase in force strength is to meet the future national security challenge” (Reuters, June 8). These two divisions are specially trained in mountain warfare and would augment the number of Indian troops to 120,000 (Stratpost.com, June 8).
Soon thereafter, in July 2009, the Indian Air Force (IAF) announced that it had planned to forward-deploy two squadrons (18 aircraft each) of Su-30 MKI advanced fighter jets at its airbase in Tezpur (150 kilometers south of the Chinese border) in Arunachal Pradesh. According to the IAF chief, “We have plans to improve infrastructure in the north-east. We’re upgrading four-five airfields and Advanced Landing Grounds (ALG). We’re also going to be basing a fleet of Sukhoi-30s in Tezpur in addition to the existing MiG 21s fighter jets” (Stratpost.com, July 21). The ALGs are strategically located at Daulat Beg Oldie and in Chushul on the border with Aksai Chin in the proximity of Karakoram Highway. In addition, the IAF has plans to position Su-30 MKIs at Chabua and Jorhat in Assam, Panagarh in West Bengal and Purnea in Bihar (Sifynews.com, July 10).
Interestingly, there is a maritime dimension to the military developments in the Himalayas. Located at an altitude of 14,500 feet, the Pangong Lake is under the control of both China (90 kilometers) and India (45 kilometers), but a stretch of about 5 km is disputed (Indian Express, October 6, 2008). Both sides have positioned patrol vessels and conduct routine surveillance. There have been regular incidents of transgression and incursions but both sides have exercised restraint and adopted a standard drill that helps disengagement; when boats from both sides come face to face with each other, they raise flags and shout ‘hindi chini bhai bhai’ (Indian and Chinese are brothers) and disengage. China operates 22 boats manned by 5-7 personnel each and India has deployed 2 large boats operated by 21 personnel each. In 2008, the Indian navy chief had visited the lake and India has plans to augment its capability by deploying more boats in the lake (Indian Express, October 7, 2008).
The Indian Ministry of Defense Report 2008-2009 has expressed concerns over China’s military capabilities and observed that ‘greater transparency and openness’ is critical but on a conciliatory note also stated that India will ‘engage China, while taking all necessary measures to protect its national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty’ (Indian Express, July 12). There are fears in India about China’s military modernization and augmentation of military infrastructure along the borders. China has been increasing its defense budget on a regular basis and in 2009 it announced a 14.9 percent rise in military spending to 480.6 billion renminbi ($70.3 billion) marking 21 years of double-digit growth (Defence.pk, March 4). Yet, unofficial estimates place the total amount much higher than the figures the Chinese government claims.
The Indian military leadership has expressed concern about the growing military power potential of China. Admiral Sureesh Mehta, chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, categorically stated that “In military terms, both conventionally and unconventionally, we can neither have the capability nor the intention to match China force for force …” but cautioned that as China consolidates itself and builds its comprehensive national power and a powerful military, it is “likely to be more assertive on its claims, especially in the immediate neighborhood [sic].” Further, “It is quite evident that coping with China will certainly be one of our [India] primary challenges in the years ahead. Our trust deficit with China can never be liquidated unless our boundary problems are resolved” (Zeenews.com, August 10).
In the 21st Century, China and India have emerged as major Asian powers and are engaged in building their respective strengths. The current trends in their bilateral political and economic relations augers well for Asian prosperity. Yet, the slow pace of talks on demarcation and delineation of the boundary (commenced in 2003), military infrastructure developments along the border, are some of the issues that remain uppermost in the minds of Indian planners and strategic analysts. The boundary dispute gains greater salience given the fact that China has resolved its boundary disputes with most of its neighbors, while its dispute with India remains unresolved. It is fair to argue that China is biding time to build its comprehensive national power including military capability reflected in Deng Xiaoping’s thought “tao guang yang hui," which literally translates as "hide brightness, nourish obscurity," and in Beijing’s interpretation, "Bide our time and build up our capabilities" and then challenge India at the time of its choosing.
Notes
1. Author's discussions with retired Indian army officers in August 2009.
2. Shailender Arya, “The Train to Lhasa’ Journal of Defence Studies, winter 2008.
3. Rajan, D.S. 2009. ‘China: Media Anger on Arunachal Pradesh Continues Unabated’, SAAG Paper No. 3260, June 18, 2009.
4. Arun Sehgal, “Military Moves and Reactions: The PLA’s Profile in Tibet is Increasing in Strength and Sophistication”, Pragati: The Indian National Interest Review, No 28, July 2009, pp.15-18.
5. Ibid.
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